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1 l i e I l i ; i h • m i « I '\|'| ! '•.• -jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to 
A •: • : 4; UI Sectioi i 3 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. §§ yj I -<>< )2 U){a), i, ', 
46b-16, 78-2a-3 (2)(a), and Rule ^ .,; U„ • ' * '^\r Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Petition for Review appeals two of , ; , ._; i, ,.i ;i ! , +1;o Findings 
of Fact, Conchw>k,L •' ; - ' • '•• •• i ni the Utah State Tax Commission. 
P. - ;t.. . •.- .»ial ("Action") does not concede, but also does not appeal the 
portion of the Tax Commission's decision concerning the au^.- i •* .*.: 
Action's personal property as exen wo issues presented for review are: 
ISSUE I 
For tax years 1989-1993, whether Action's "rent-to-own" pei^ .:.< . * : • i 
be subject to an "escaped property" a^tvvsjijuiil im !«•" * l»:il ' "ode Ann. §§ 59-2-102 (8), 
- J U V . < \ - . 
ISSUE II 
For tax year- 1 otv;-1 n j ,,...... ' personal property was 
vain.'-l At its Lin iini ! .- under Art. XIII, §§ 2(1), 3(1) of the Utah Constitution and 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-102 (9), 10? (]) (1996 & Supp. 1998). 
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The Utah Code clearly sets out the applicable standard for appellate review of Tax 
Commission rulings: 
When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the 
commission, the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the [tax] commission deference concerning its written findings 
of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, 
applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of 
discretion contained in the statute at issue before the appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (1996); see South Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc. 
v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Cornm'n, 951 P.2d 218, 222 (Utah 1997). 
Issue No. I presents an issue of law in which Action challenges the Tax 
Commission's Conclusion of Law that Action's property "was escaped property." This 
Court previously held in First Security Mortgage Co. v. Salt Lake County, 866 P.2d 1250, 
1251 (Utah App. 1993) that ft[w]hether property has escaped assessment is a legal 
question . . ..ff Issues of law are to be reviewed by applying a "correction of error" 
standard under which the Court of Appeals gives no deference to the Tax Commission's 
conclusions of law, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in the statute 
at issue. Cache Co. v. Property Tax Div. of Tax Cornm'n., 922 P.2d 758, 763-64 (Utah 
1996). Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (8) contains no explicit grant of discretion. 
Therefore, whether Action's "rent-to-own" personal property should have been assessed 
by the County as "escaped property" must be decided under a "correction of error" 
standard. 
#:>8Mi 2 
Iti Issue No. II, the , ,i\ i oiiinii.,. m. .-•• • • !*<> -M*" t ndintis of fact concerning 
the actiu. i*ii* nu.i; . M-to-own" persona! property. However, 
A l rallenges the Tax Commission's Conclusion of Law that Action's property "is 
properly valued as having a five year [sicj UK p ^nded Schedules 
For Personal Property v a I u -111 i i -1 u w 1111 - * 1. v the Utah State Tax Commission." 
Record i "P ") ;ii ^ Action also challenges the portion of the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision in which the Tax Commission determined that imm ilit: rvnlaiiT presented that 
the five year [sicj class me e;.iai .. . l • mmended Schedules for Personal 
Proj* *i: ; roner valuation method for the subject property." R. IU M *. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated that its "past ue^ib: ;.. .. <v ..; 
Commission determinations w! kii: ;...HIA * *i.*.. '• uvaied such issues as questions of 
•
f
 >chii. s / ; v. Utah State Tax Comm'tL. 911 P.2d 103, 109 (Utah 
1997). As such, the Court of Appeals must apply the "substantial evidence -. . 
Under the "substantial evidence" standai* ' >i •. .-; *• "must uphold the 
Commission's ImdiM; il il '-.vipporl^ -• I In substantial evidence based upon the record as 
a whole.'" Alta Pacific Associates, Ltd, v. Utah State Tax Comrn Vi,,, {JS I P. J,d 11 •J>, l «i«' 
(Utah 1997) (quoting Beaver Lount\ . ^ - "16 P.2d344, 354 
(i "ui,. i v -; . *- l- applying the 'substantial evidence test1 must consider 
both the evidence that supports the Tax Commission's factual findings and the evidence 
that detracts from the findings. Nevertheless, lln.1 |uih . I illeii^iiir ill." findings . . . must 
marshal . suppoi line (in* findings and show that despite the supporting 
f* "' ?1 T A Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence." 
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National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, et ai, 799 
P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). However, where the factual findings are "legally 
insufficient," an appellant "need not engage in a futile marshalling exercise . . . . " 
Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 1995). In such cases, the appellate 
court "will only grant. . . deference [to the fact finder] when the findings of fact are 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's decision." Woodward 
v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE 
With regard to Issue No. I, the statutory provisions at issue are Utah Code Ann. §§ 
59-2-102 (8) (1996 & Supp. 1998), 59-2-306 (1) (1996) and 59-2-309 (1) (1996). These 
provisions provide: 
59-2-102(8). 
(8)(a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, or 
any improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect 
parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority; 
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the 
taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this chapter; or 
(iii) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing authority based 
upon incomplete or erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer, 
(b) Property which is undervalued because of the use of a different 
application of the same valuation methodology is not "escaped property." 
59-2-306 (1). 
(1) The county assessor may request a signed statement in affidavit form 
from any person setting forth all the real and personal property assessable 
by the assessor which is owned, possessed, managed, or under the control 
0VSM1 4 
of the person at 1 z o ciock noon oi 1 January 1. This statement si mil be 'filed 
v 'ithin 30 days a!Vr requested by the assessor. 
S^?^09(11 .• . • • • . .- , 
,
 4; <\ny escaped property may be assessed by tlie original assessing 
authority at any time as far back as five years prior to the time of discovery, 
in which case the assessor shall enter the assessments on the tax rolls and 
follow the procedures established under Part 13 of this chapter. 
With regard to Issue No. II, the constitutional ana ;.;;; 
issue are Article XIII, Sections 2* i .. . . . . ^ < ' v .'md Utah Code Ann. §§ 
59-.!- Ii L! (,S)< n % ;v iiij»| ! 59-2-103 (1) (1996). Theseprovisionsprovi.de, in 
pnliiMif part: 
Section 2. 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
Section 3. 
i i ; l ne Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in 
money, except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The 
Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person and corporation 
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property. 
(8) "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the 
relevant facts. . . . 
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59-2-103(1). 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform 
and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, 
unless otherwise provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING. 
This is a petition for review by Action of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Final Decision of the Utah State Tax Commission ("Final Decision"), dated January 
14, 1998, in Action TVy Action TV & Rental v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah (Tax Commission Appeal Nos. 96-0917, 96-2215), finding that 
Action's "rent-to-own" personal property is "escaped property," that the Salt Lake County 
Assessor had the authority to issue an assessment for the years 1989 through 1994, and 
that the five-year class life established in the Tax Commission's recommended valuation 
schedules provides the proper valuation of Action's "rent-to-own" property. R. at 9-10. 
IL PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
In 1994, the Salt Lake County Assessor ("Assessor") audited Action's businesses 
and issued an assessment of additional property taxes with respect to Action's "rent-to-
own" personal property for tax years 1989-1994. The assessment for 1994 was a current-
year assessment, and the assessment for tax years 1989-1993 was an "escaped property" 
assessment issued under the authority of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (1). The Assessor 
made a similar assessment in 1995 for Action's 1995 tax year. Action timely filed 
separate appeals of these assessments to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
("Board"). Both appeals were ultimately denied and Action timely appealed the Board's 
decisions to the Utah State Tax Commission ("Commission") (Tax Commission Appeal 
Nos. 96-0917 and 96-2215). Action's appeals were consolidated by the Commission. R. 
at 53. Action's consolidated appeals were heard in a formal adjudicative proceeding on 
September 11, 1997 (R. at 14), and the Commission issued its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("Final Decision") on January 14, 1998. R. at 
14-20. On February 13, 1998, Action filed its Petition For Review of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision of The Utah State Tax Commission before the 
Utah Supreme Court ("Petition For Review"). R. at 2. Action's Petition For Review was 
"poured-over" to the Utah Court of Appeals on May 7, 1998, by order of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
IIL DECISION OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
On January 14, 1998, the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Final Decision (Appeal Nos. 96-0917 and 96-2215). R. at 14-20. A copy of 
the Final Decision is attached as Appendix A. In its Final Decision, the Commission 
found, in relevant part,1 that Action "had not claimed the subject items of personal 
property on its property tax affidavits for the years in question" (R. at 6), that Action 
was audited in May, 1994, by the Salt Lake County Assessor for tax years 1989 to 1994 
(R. at 6), that Action also appealed its 1995 personal property assessment (R. at 6), that 
the Assessor's assessments were based on Action's "cost for the items of property at issue 
1
 Action recites only those conclusions that are relevant to the issues on appeal 
and does not recite conclusions that are only relevant to the unappealed issue. 
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multiplied by the percent good tables as established by the Tax Commission in its 
Recommended Schedules For Personal Property Valuation" and that the "percent good 
was based on a five year [sic] class life" (R. at 6), that "[d]uring the period in question 
rent-to-own businesses did not uniformly report or value items of personal property on 
their personal property affidavits," that the "County did not audit personal property 
affidavits of other rent-to-own businesses," and that "many of these businesses paid less 
in property tax than the legally required amount and less than the amount being assessed 
against Petitioner" (R. at 7). 
The Commission also concluded, in relevant part,2 that Action's "rent-to-own" 
personal property "was escaped property pursuant to the definition set out in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-2-102 (8)" for tax years 1989-1994 (R. at 7), and that Action's "rent-to-own" 
personal property was "properly valued as having a five year [sic] life by following the 
Recommended Schedules For Personal Property Valuation promulgated by the Utah State 
Tax Commission." R. at 9. The Commission's Final Decision held, in relevant part,3 
that "the subject property is clearly 'escaped property' within the meaning of the statute," 
that the Assessor "had the authority to issue the property tax assessment for the years 
1989 through 1994" (R. at 9), and that "the five year [sic] class life established in the 
2
 Action recites only those portions of the Tax Commission's decision that are 
relevant to the issues on appeal and does not recite those portions that are only relevant to 
the unappealed issue. 
3
 Action recites only those facts that are relevant to the issues on appeal and does 
not recite facts that are only relevant to the unappealed issue. 
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Recommended Schedules for Personal Property Valuation is the proper valuation method 
for the subject property" (R. at 9). 
IV. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
1. During the years at issue in this proceeding, Action engaged in a "rent-to-
own" business. R. at 900-901. A "rent-to-own" business primarily sells furniture, 
appliances and electronic items to residential customers under a "rent-to-own" agreement 
or contract. R. at 833. A "rent-to-own" agreement is an alternative financing mechanism, 
the terms and conditions of which are usually specified pursuant to a specific state statute. 
R. at 861-863, 901. A "rent-to-own" agreement differs from a pure sale and from a pure 
rental or "rent-to-rent" agreement. R. at 840-842. Under a "rent-to-own" agreement, a 
customer obtains the use of personal property from a "rent-to-own" business for a 
specified time period, generally 12-21 months. "Rent-to-own" customers often suffer 
from some form of bad credit and are unable to obtain financing through any of the 
traditional financing mechanisms. R. at 841, 843, 901, 984. Under a "rent-to-own" 
agreement, if the customer makes all the payments during the term of the agreement, the 
customer obtains full title to the personal property at no additional cost. R. at 861-862, 
912. Under this kind of an agreement, the customer also has the right to return the 
property before the expiration of the full term of the agreement with no further obligation. 
R. at 861-863, 884. If an item is returned, a "rent-to-own" business attempts to (1) enter 
into another "rent-to-own" agreement with another customer, usually for a shorter term 
than the first agreement, (2) make an outright sale of the item, or (3) "junk" or donate the 
item to charity if it no longer has any remaining commercial value. R. at 850, 883. 
#58543 9 
Generally, a "rent-to-own" business will sell or otherwise dispose of its "rent-to-own" 
personal property within two years. R. at 845, 855. 
2. Action's predecessor business, Curtis Mathis, was one of the first "rent-to-
own" businesses in the country and commenced selling under "rent-to-own" contracts as 
early as the late 1970fs. R. at 842. 
3. Since the inception of the "rent-to-own" concept, there has been great 
confusion within the "rent-to-own" industry concerning how "rent-to-own" property 
should be reported for property tax purposes. R. at 887, 893, 908. Each Utah member of 
the "rent-to-own" industry has had a different understanding of Utah law and filed their 
annual personal property affidavits on a different basis. R. at 887, 893, 908. 
4. Since it went into business, Action has reviewed Utah law and made 
inquiries to state and county taxing officials concerning the proper way to report "rent-to-
own" property for property tax purposes. Based upon its research, Action consistently 
filed its annual personal property affidavits for at least fourteen years, including the years 
at issue, under the premise that personal property held under "rent-to-own" contracts was 
exempt from taxation pursuant to a constitutional and statutory property tax exemption 
#58543 10 
extended to inventory held for sale in the ordinary course of business. R. at 900, 904-907, 
909, Hearing Transcript ("TR.") at 148-1494. 
5. Since it went into business, Action has timely filed every property tax 
report and return required by Utah law or requested by the Salt Lake County Assessor. R. 
at 905, 909. 
6. Action was audited by the Salt Lake County Assessor in May, 1994, and 
received an audit assessment for years 1989-1994. R. at 935. The audit was based upon 
the premise that property in the possession of one of Action's customers under a "rent-to-
own" agreement does not qualify as inventory and is, therefore, subject to property 
taxation and that Action's "rent-to-own" property was "escaped property" under Utah law 
and subject to an "escaped property" assessment for up to five years. R. at 935, 939-941, 
948-949. The Assessor valued Action's "rent-to-own" property for purposes of the 
assessment pursuant to the Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules For Personal 
Property Valuation as Class 3, five-year class life property. R. at 946-947. 
7. The Assessor's office did not perform an appraisal of any of Action's "rent-
to-own" property subject to the 1989-1994 and 1995 audit assessments. R. at 946-947, 
954, 956, 963, 973. The Assessor's office has never personally appraised any property 
that has been sold under a "rent-to-own" agreement. R. at 946-947, 954, 956, 963, 973. 
4
 The Record certified by the Tax Commission appears to be missing some pages. 
In File No. 3 of 4 of the Tax Commission Record, the volume which contains the 
transcript of the formal hearing, pages 146-155 from the certified transcript are missing. 
These pages would have been numbered as Record Page Nos. 917-926. A copy of the 
actual pages 146-155 are appended to this brief in Appendix B. References to these 
missing pages will be made by using "TR." 
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The Assessor's office derived its value for Action's "rent-to-own" property by multiplying 
the cost of each item as reported in Action's business records by a percentage set forth in 
the Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules For Personal Property Valuation. R. at 
927, 946-947, 954, 956, 963, 969-970, 973. 
8. The Salt Lake County Assessor has not audited or issued "escaped 
property" assessments to all "rent-to-own" businesses in Salt Lake County. R. at 89, 496, 
837-838, 952-954. No other "rent-to-own" business has been subjected to a five-year 
"escaped property" assessment. R. at 89, 496, 952-954. 
9. Action appealed the 1989-1994 audit assessment to the Salt Lake County 
Board of Equalization. Action's appeal was heard by a County hearing officer. Action's 
1995 personal property affidavit was due prior to the issuance of a decision on the 1989-
1994 assessment, and Action completed the 1995 Affidavit in the same fashion it had 
consistently done for at least fourteen years, treating "rent-to-own" property as exempt 
inventory. R. at 900. The Assessor subsequently made an additional assessment with 
respect to Action's "rent-to-own" property for 1995, based upon its determination that 
Action's "rent-to-own" property was taxable. Action timely appealed this additional 
assessment to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. 
10. The County's hearing officer recommended, and the Board of Equalization 
decided the 1989-1994 appeal against Action. In that appeal, Action relied on its 
constitutional exemption argument and challenged the propriety of the "escaped property" 
assessment but did not offer significant evidence concerning the value of its "rent-to-
own" property. 
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11. With respect to Action's 1995 appeal, the same hearing officer who heard 
the 1989-1994 appeal also heard Action's 1995 appeal Based upon the evidence 
presented at the hearing on the 1995 appeal, the hearing officer recommended to the 
Board of Equalization that Action's "rent-to-own" property be classified as Class 1, three-
year class life property rather than Class 3, five-year class life property.5 R. at 984-985. 
Without notice to Action or an opportunity for hearing, the Board of Equalization decided 
not to accept the hearing officer's recommendation concerning the valuation of "rent-to-
own" property and denied Action's appeal. Action subsequently appealed the 1995 
decision to the Utah State Tax Commission. R. at 985. Action has paid the 1989-1994 
and 1995 assessments in full. 
12. The 1989-1994 and the 1995 appeals were consolidated by the Tax 
Commission and a formal adjudicative proceeding was held for the consolidated appeals 
on September 11, 1997. 
13. Action timely filed personal property affidavits for every year at issue and 
did so based upon a good faith attempt to understand and comply with Utah law. R. at 
905-907. Action's understanding of Utah property tax law was based upon its research 
and inquiry from which it concluded that "rent-to-own" property was exempt from the 
Utah property tax because it qualified as inventory held for sale in the ordinary course of 
Action's business. R. at 904-907. 
5
 The hearing officer also recommended that Action's constitutional exemption 
argument be denied. There was no "escaped property" issue in the 1995 appeal. 
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14. Action and the County agree that Action took no action in an attempt to 
evade Utah's property tax. R. at 905, 909, 956, 974. Action cooperated with the County 
in every regard. R. at 909, 937, 943, 974. 
15. The law applicable to the taxation of "rent-to-own" property is confused 
and each "rent-to-own" business in the state filed their personal property affidavits in a 
different fashion. R. at 834-837, 887. Many of these businesses sought professional 
advice and made inquiries to the Tax Commission or the County regarding the proper 
manner to report "rent-to-own" property. R. at 834-837, 962. Many of them received 
advice contrary to the position taken by the Assessor in Action's audits. R. at 834-837, 
962. 
16. Prior to 1995, the Tax Commission's recommended personal property 
valuation schedules were only published as bulletins and were not adopted as official 
administrative rules. Resp.'s Ex. R-5.6 The Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules 
For Personal Property Valuation was first promulgated as an administrative rule on 
February 13, 1995, the date when Rule R884-24P-33 first became effective. R. at 927, 
931-933, 948, 969. The 1994 Tax Commission personal property bulletin stated that 
"rent-to-own" businesses "may establish an exemption for inventory by filing form TC-
6
 The Tax Commission Record does not paginate the exhibits admitted into 
evidence or the other documents submitted at formal hearing, e.g. copies of 
administrative and judicial decisions and statutes. The Tax Commission did not mark the 
"other documents" as exhibits, but accepted them pursuant to Rule R861-1A-7. J., Utah 
Administrative Code, which allows the Tax Commission to take official notice of various 
matters. The exhibits and "other documents" are contained in Volume 4 of 4 of the Tax 
Commission Record and will be referred to herein by Exhibit No. or other description 
where no Exhibit No. was given. 
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595 with the county assessor in the county where the property has situs." R. at 947 and 
the last page of Resp.'s Ex. R-5. The provisions in Tax Commission bulletins dealing 
with the proper assessment of "rent-to-own" property changed from one year to the next. 
R. at 957-958. Neither the Tax Commission nor the Salt Lake County Assessor 
understood what Form TC-595 was or how to correctly complete the form. R. at 927-
928, TR. at 152-1537. Form TC-595 was never used by Utah tax officials. TR. at 152-
1538. Salt Lake County had never seen and did not have any Forms TC-595, and Action 
had to obtain them from the Tax Commission. R. at 958, 969. The Salt Lake County 
Assessor was unclear whether and how "rent-to-own" property should be taxed and how 
Form TC-595 should be used. The Assessor submitted a request for advisory ruling to the 
Tax Commission in June, 1996, seeking guidance from the Tax Commission concerning 
the proper manner to assess and tax "rent-to-own" property. R. at 928, 958-959, 969, 
988-989. (A copy of the advisory ruling request is one of the last documents included in 
Volume 4 of 4 of the Tax Commission Record and because the pages in Volume No. 4 of 
4 are not numbered, a copy is attached to this brief as Appendix C.) The Tax 
Commission amended Rule R884-24P-33, effective December 20, 1996, deleting all 
references to and requirements to use Form TC-595. 
17. During the years at issue, federal tax law required "rent-to-own" businesses 
to depreciate their "rent-to-own" property for federal income tax purposes over a five-
year period. R. at 845-846. Notwithstanding federal law, most "rent-to-own" businesses 
7
 See explanation in Footnote No. 4. 
8
 See explanation in Footnote No. 4. 
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across the country depreciated their "rent-to-own" property for both tax and accounting 
purposes on some basis other than a five-year life in order to better reflect the economic 
life of the property. R. at 845-848. The clear majority of "rent-to-own" businesses used 
either an 18-month, a 21-month, or a 24-month, straight-line depreciation method. R. at 
846-848. Action used a 24-month depreciation schedule for tax and accounting purposes. 
R. at 855. 
18. Generally, the Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules For Personal 
Property Valuation follow IRS class life schedules. R. at 891, 929-930, TR. at 1549. The 
Tax Commission's 1994 publication and its Rule R884-24P-33 (1995) both provided that 
county assessors could "deviate from the schedules when warranted by specific 
conditions affecting an item of personal property." Page No. i of Resp.'s Ex. R-5. After 
significant testimony before Congress concerning the actual economic life of "rent-to-
own" property, Sections 168 (e) and (g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 were 
amended, enacting a three-year recovery period and a four-year class life classification 
for "qualified rent-to-own property." R. at 848-849, 893, 983.10 
19. The transient nature of "rent-to-own" customers and other factors subjects 
"rent-to-own" property to extraordinary wear and tear and physical depreciation. R. at 
9
 See explanation in Footnote No. 4. 
10
 A copy of relevant pages from a publication reporting the changes to Sections 
168 (e) and (g) was submitted to the Tax Commission at formal hearing. For some 
unknown reason, only one of those pages is included in Volume 4 of 4 of the Tax 
Commission's Record. A copy of the actual submission, as it was submitted to the Tax 
Commission on September 11, 1997, is appended hereto as Appendix D and a more 
formal copy of relevant statutes from the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is appended 
hereto as Appendix E. 
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816, 819, 859-861, 867, 882-883, 901-902, 963, 984-985, TR. at 146-14811. The type of 
furniture sold by "rent-to-own" businesses is "low end furniture,11 the "least expensive 
furniture that's on the market today." R. at 824. The appliances sold by Action were also 
"low end." R. at 825. The fact that "rent-to-own" furniture is "low end furniture" has an 
impact on its value as it "doesn't last as long. It wears out faster. It[fs] used up much 
sooner than quality furniture." R. at 824. The same is true for electronic items and 
appliances. R. at 819-820, 825. "Rent-to-own" property that has been used by a 
customer and returned was in poor condition and "could be used for part[s] or a boat 
anchor. There's hardly anyone that would put any of this stuff in their house. This stuff 
was in real bad shape." R. at 827. "Rent-to-own" businesses also experience a high 
incidence of customers who remove themselves and the "rent-to-own" property from the 
jurisdiction and who fail to make the required payments and of customers who pawn the 
"rent-to-own" property. R. at 862, 902. 
20. Action's valuation witnesses all testified that the useful life of "rent-to-own" 
property was between 18-24 months. R. at 819-820, 858-859, 867, 908-909, TR. at 146-
14712, 929. Action's valuation witnesses based their opinions upon a generally accepted 
standard of fair market value. R. at 813-814. 
21. The Assessor did not perform independent appraisals of Action's "rent-to-
own" property and have not performed an independent appraisal of any "rent-to-own" 
property, and the Assessor offered no evidence to dispute the appraisal and testimony of 
11
 See explanation in Footnote No. 4. 
12
 See explanation in Footnote No. 4. 
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Action's witnesses concerning the useful life of "rent-to-own" property. R. at 946-947, 
954-956, 963, 973-974. 
22. The price at which a "rent-to-own" business may sell an item of personal 
property under a "rent-to-own" agreement may exceed the property's fair market value to 
account for the risk involved with "rent-to-own" customers. R. at 879-882, 894, 913-915. 
The sales price to a "rent-to-own" customer may not reflect the property's actual fair 
market value because "rent-to-own" customers are a special group of buyer who may not 
be able to purchase similar items in any other way because of poor credit. R. at 879-882, 
913-915. Therefore, sales to customers under "rent-to-own" agreements may not qualify 
as "arm's-length" sales. R. at 825-826. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Commission erred in determining that Action's "rent-to-own" property 
was "escaped property" because the Commission failed to make adequate findings or 
conclusions to support its decision and because the facts of the case do not fit within one 
of the statutory definitions of "escaped property" or support a conclusion that Action's 
"rent-to-own" property was "escaped property." 
II. The Commission failed to make adequate findings or conclusions with 
respect to the issue of the fair market value of Action's "rent-to-own" property. The 
Commission's ultimate decision that its own schedules properly value "rent-to-own" 
property based on a five-year class life is not supported by substantial evidence in light of 
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the whole record, and the Commission should have found that Action's "rent-to-own" 
property has only a two or three-year life. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT ACTION'S 
"RENT-TO-OWN" PROPERTY WAS "ESCAPED PROPERTY." 
Action's challenge of the Tax Commission's decision that Action's "rent-to-own" 
property "was escaped property" presents an issue of law. This Court previously held in 
First Security Mortgage Co. v. Salt Lake County, 866 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Utah App. 1993) 
that "[w]hether property has escaped assessment is a legal question . ..." Therefore, as 
previously discussed above under "Standard Of Appellate Review," whether Action's 
"rent-to-own" personal property should have been assessed by the County as "escaped 
property" must be decided under a "correction of error" standard under which this Court 
gives no deference to the Commission's interpretation of the applicable statute. First 
Security Mortgage Co. v. Salt Lake County at 1251. In addition, the statute under which 
the Assessor made an "escaped property" assessment against Action, Utah Code Ann. § 
59-2-309 (1), is a "taxing" statute. Utah law is clear that "statutes imposing taxes and 
prescribing tax procedures should generally be construed favorably to the taxpayer and 
strictly against the taxing authority." Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 450 
P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1969); see also Salt Lake County v. State Tax Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1131, 
1132 (Utah 1989) and Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 270, n. 8 
(Utah App. 1993). 
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The relevant statute is Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-102 (8) (1996 & Supp. 1998) 
which provides: 
(8)(a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, or 
any improvements to the property, subject to taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect 
parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority; 
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the 
taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this chapter; or 
(iii) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing authority based 
upon incomplete or erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer, 
(b) Property which is undervalued because of the use of a different 
application of the same valuation methodology is not "escaped property." 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 59-2-102 (8), which were enacted by the 
Utah Legislature in 1989, property will only be considered "escaped property" and 
subject to the "escaped property provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (1) if the facts 
indicate that one of the events described in Section 59-2-102 (8) (i), (ii), or (iii) has 
occurred." First Security Mortgage Co. v. Salt Lake County, 866 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Utah 
App. 1993)("the facts of this case [do not] fit within one of the three definitions of 
escaped property"). In addition, property will not be considered to be "escaped property" 
if the facts indicate that the circumstances described in Section 59-2-102 (8)(b) are 
present. 
The difficulty in analyzing the Commission's Final Decision in light of the 
appropriate legal standard is that the Final Decision made no specific finding of fact 
concerning "escaped property" and entered no conclusion of law concerning which, if 
any, of the provisions of Section 59-2-102 (8) may be applicable. The Commission's 
Finding of Fact most closely relevant to an inquiry concerning "escaped property" is 
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Finding of Fact No. 4 in which the Commission found that Action ,fhad not claimed the 
subject items of personal property on its property tax affidavits for the years in question." 
R. at 15. The only other Finding of Fact relevant to the "escaped property" issue is 
Finding of Fact No. 8 in which the Commission found that "[djuring the period in 
question rent-to-own businesses did not uniformly report or value items of personal 
property on their personal property affidavits" and that the "County did not audit 
personal property affidavits of other rent-to-own businesses" resulting in a situation 
where "many of these businesses paid less in property tax than the legally required 
amount and less than the amount being assessed against Petitioner." R. at 16. These 
findings are generally supportive of Action's claim that its "rent-to-own" property is not 
"escaped property." 
With respect to the Commission's Conclusions of Law, the Commission made no 
attempt to analyze the applicable statute, but simply entered Conclusion of Law No. 1 that 
"[t]he subject property at issue assessed by Respondent for the years 1989 through 1994 
was escaped property pursuant to the definition set out in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 
(8)." R. at 18. The Commission's Final Decision and Order provide no greater insight 
into the Commission's reasoning in that the Commission merely stated that "the subject 
property is clearly 'escaped property' within the meaning of the statute." R. at 18. 
Because the Commission failed to analyze the facts and apply them to the appropriate 
law, Action will do so. 
First, Section 59-2-102 (8)(a)(i) provides that property, including personal 
property, will qualify as "escaped property" if "it is inadvertently omitted from the tax 
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rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the assessing 
authority." This provision does not apply because there is no evidence or allegation by 
either party that Action's "rent-to-own" property was "inadvertently omitted from the tax 
rolls, assigned to the wrong parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the assessing 
authority." Second, Section 59-2-102 (8)(a)(ii) provides that property will qualify as 
"escaped property" if it is "undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the 
failure of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this chapter. As 
discussed below, Action argues that this provision also does not apply. Third, Section 59-
2-102 (8)(a)(iii) provides that property will qualify as "escaped property" if it is 
"undervalued because of errors made by the assessing authority based upon incomplete or 
erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer. In order for Subsection (iii) to apply, 
the facts must indicate that the subject property has been "undervalued." An 
"undervaluation" of property occurs when property is listed, but listed at less than its 
actual fair market value on the tax rolls. County Board of Equalization v. Nupetco, 779 
P.2d 1138, 1139 (Utah 1989). There is no evidence or allegation by either party to this 
proceeding that Action's "rent-to-own" property was "undervalued." Since 
"undervaluation" is a pre-condition to the invocation of Subsection (iii), it cannot apply. 
Fourth, Section 59-2-102 (8)(b) provides that "[p]roperty which is undervalued because 
of the use of a different valuation methodology or because of a different application of the 
same valuation methodology is not 'escaped property.'" Once again, this provision has no 
probable application to the facts of this case because neither party argues that Action's 
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"rcnt-to-own" property was "undervalued." Subsection (8)(b) cannot apply if there has 
been no "undervaluation" of property. 
Returning to the analysis of Section 59-2-102 (8)(a)(ii), Action argues that 
Subsection (ii) is inapplicable under the facts of this case. In order for Subsection (ii) to 
apply, the Commission was required to determine that Action's "rent-to-own" property 
was either "undervalued" or "omitted" from the tax rolls because of Action's failure to 
comply with the reporting requirements of Chapter 2, Title 59. Since there is no evidence 
or allegation that Action's "rent-to-own" property was "undervalued," this portion of 
Subsection (8)(a)(ii) cannot apply. The remaining question is whether Action's "rent-to-
own" property was "omitted" from the tax rolls because of Action's failure to comply with 
the reporting requirements of Chapter 2, Title 59. 
The simple answer to this inquiry is that Action's "rent-to-own" property was not 
"omitted" from the tax rolls because of its failure to comply with reporting requirements 
because the Commission made no such finding or conclusion. In addition to the 
Commission's failure to make such a finding or conclusion, the Commission's Decision 
holding that "the subject property is clearly 'escaped property' within the meaning of the 
statute" is not substantially supported by the record. In order to invoke the provisions of 
Subsection (ii), the facts would have to show that Action's "rent-to-own" property was 
"omitted" from the tax rolls because of Action's failure to comply with the reporting 
requirements of Chapter 2, Title 59. 
The only reporting requirement imposed upon personal property taxpayers is found 
in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-306 (1): 
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(1) The county assessor may request a signed statement in affidavit form 
from any person setting forth all the real and personal property assessable 
by the assessor which is owned, possessed, managed, or under the control 
of the person at 12 o'clock noon on January 1. This statement shall be filed 
within 30 days after requested by the assessor. 
Emphasis added. 
The facts of the case clearly indicate that Action timely filed its personal property 
affidavits for each year at issue and made a good faith effort to understand and comply 
with Utah law. R. at 905-907. Action also filed every property tax report and return 
required by Utah law or requested by the Assessor. R. at 905-907. In addition, the 
Record reflects that Action's understanding that "rent-to-own" property qualified as tax 
exempt inventory and, therefore, not "assessable by the assessor" was based upon its 
review of the law and upon research and inquiry. R. at 904-907. The Record further 
reveals that: (1) Action had consistently filed its personal property affidavits in the same 
manner for at least fourteen years (R. at 842, 900, 904-907, 909, TR. at 148-149); (2) that 
there has been great confusion within and without the "rent-to-own" industry, including 
among state and county taxing officials, concerning the manner in which "rent-to-own" 
property should be reported for property tax purposes, and each member of the "rent-to-
own" industry understood Utah reporting requirements differently and reported their 
"rent-to-own" property on a different basis (R. at 834-837, 887, 893, 908, 928, 958-959, 
962, 969, 988-989); (3) at the time of the Board hearing in 1996, the Assessor had not 
audited all "rent-to-own" businesses in Salt Lake County or issued five-year "escaped 
property" audit assessments to any other audited "rent-to-own" business (R. at 89, 496, 
837-838, 952-954); (4) Action and the Assessor agree that Action took no action or made 
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any attempt to evade Utah's property tax through its personal property affidavit or 
otherwise and that Action fully cooperated with the Assessor and its audit in every respect 
(R. at 905, 909, 937, 943, 956, 974); (5) the Tax Commission's personal property bulletin 
containing directives concerning the assessment and taxation of "rent-to-own" property 
was not adopted and published as an administrative rule during the tax years 1989-1994 
(R. at 927, 931-933, 948, 969), and the Commission's recommended personal property 
valuation schedules were only adopted as an official administrative rule after the 
Commission was directed to do so by the Division of Administrative Rules to provide 
notice to the public concerning the Commission's policies with respect to personal 
property assessments (R. at 932-933); (6) the directive in the Commission's 1994 
personal property tax publication that "rent-to-own" businesses could "establish an 
exemption for inventory by filing form TC-595" was not well-known to the "rent-to-own" 
industry. There is no evidence in the Record that Action was aware of this directive prior 
to 1994, and the directive was not well understood by either the Commission or the 
Assessor (R. at 927-928, TR. at 152-153); (7) Commission directives dealing with "rent-
to-own" property changed from year-to-year (R. at 957-958); (8) Form TC-595 was not 
used by the Commission or the County, and the Assessor had not previously seen or used 
Form TC-595 (TR. at 152-153, R. at 958, 969); (9) the Commission withdrew Form TC-
595 from usage in 1996 and deleted all references to it in the Commission's 
administrative rule. (Rule R884-24P-33 (1996).); and (10) the Assessor was unclear 
whether and how "rent-to-own" property should be taxed and how Form TC-595 should 
be used. This is evidenced by the Assessor's 1996 request for advisory ruling to the Tax 
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Commission in which it asked Commission guidance on each of these issues. R. at 928, 
958-959, 969, 988-989, Appendix C. Finally, there is simply no evidence in the record 
that Commission bulletins, if they existed in years prior to 1994, contained specific 
directives to "rent-to-own" businesses, that these bulletins were distributed to "rent-to-
own" businesses, or that Action knew about or had access to a copy of such bulletins 
during the audit/"escaped property" years, 1989-1993. 
Subsection (8)(a)(ii) was not intended to apply in situations where general 
confusion exists as to the interpretation and application of law. To hold otherwise would 
mean that taxpayers may be subjected to an "escaped property" assessment every time 
they Commission or any court reviewing a Commission decision enters a decision against 
another taxpayer on a novel theory of tax law argued by a county or state taxing authority. 
This provision was also not intended to apply where a taxpayer operates under a 
good faith understanding of a law and makes no attempt to evade tax, particularly where 
the taxpayer faithfully files tax returns in a consistent manner over an extended period of 
time. The facts do not support the conclusion that Action's "rent-to-own" property was 
"omitted" from the tax rolls because of Action's failure to comply with any reporting 
requirements. Action's property was not assessed during 1989-1993 because there existed 
general confusion concerning the taxation of "rent-to-own" property and because Action 
had a good faith belief that it was filing its personal property affidavits correctly. A 
dispute of law is simply not fodder for an "escaped property" assessment. It would be 
inequitable to impose an "escaped property" assessment on Action since no other member 
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of the "rent-to-own" industry has or will be subjected to a five-year assessment back to 
1989. 
Section 59-2-309 (1) is a "taxing" statute, and the definitions found in Section 59-
2-102 (8) provide critical support to the operation and implementation of that statute. The 
Commission has not made an adequate finding or conclusion that Section 59-2-102 (8)(a) 
applies under the facts of this case, and the Record does not support such a finding or 
conclusion. As taxing statutes, Sections 59-2-102 (8)(a) and 59-2-309 (1) should be 
construed in Action's favor and strictly against the taxing authorities. 
IL THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT ACTION'S 
"RENT-TO-OWN" PROPERTY IS PROPERLY VALUED AS FIVE-
YEAR PROPERTY. 
Action challenges the portion of the Tax Commission's Final Decision in which 
the Tax Commission determined "from the evidence presented that the five year [sic] 
class life established in the Recommended Schedules for Personal Property Valuation is 
the proper valuation method for the subject property." R. at 10. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently indicated in Alta Pacific Associates, Ltd., v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n., 931 P.2d 103, 109 (Utah 1997), that in reviewing decisions of 
the Tax Commission, the Supreme Court has treated determinations of fair market value 
"as questions of fact." Consequently, this Court is required to review the Commission's 
decision under the "substantial evidence" standard. Under the "substantial evidence" 
standard, the Court of Appeals "must uphold the Commission's finding if it is 'supported 
by substantial evidence based upon the record as a whole.1" Alta Pacific Associates, Ltd., 
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v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. at 108 (quoting Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
916 P.2d 344, 354 (Utah 1996)). In addition, "[a]n appellate court applying the 
'substantial evidence test1 must consider both the evidence that supports the Tax 
Commission's factual findings and the evidence that detracts from the findings," and the 
party challenging the findings "must marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings 
and show that despite the supporting facts, the Tax Commission's findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence." First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of 
Equalization of Salt Lake County, etaL, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). However, 
where the factual findings are "legally insufficient," an appellant "need not engage in a 
futile marshalling exercise . . . . " Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 
1995). In such cases, the appellate court "will only grant.. . deference [to the fact finder] 
when the findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the 
court's decision." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Commission's Final Decision makes no specific findings of fact concerning 
the actual fair market value of Action's "rent-to-own" personal property. As such, they 
are "legally insufficient" as they fail to "disclose the evidentiary basis for the 
Commission's decision." The Commission did, however, enter a Conclusion of Law that 
Action's property "is properly valued as having a five year [sic] life by following the 
Recommended Schedules For Personal Property Valuation promulgated by the Utah State 
Tax Commission." R. at 9. The Commission's conclusion is also "legally insufficient" 
because it fails to provide any basis for the conclusion. Since the Commission's findings 
and conclusions are "legally insufficient," this Court should grant the Commission no 
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deference. Notwithstanding the Commission's failure to provide legally sufficient 
findings and conclusions, Action asserts that the Commission's decision is not 
substantially supported by the whole record, and Action has marshaled the facts on both 
sides of the issue. The marshaled facts are set forth in both Action's "Statement of 
Material Facts" set forth above, in Appendix F, and are discussed below. 
Before analyzing the facts supporting and detracting from the Commission's 
decision, Action believes it must set forth the ultimate standard against which the facts 
must be judged. Art. XIII, sec. 2 (1) of the Utah Constitution requires, in pertinent part, 
that "[a]ll tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or 
under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its 
value, to be ascertained as provided by law." Art. XIII, sec. 3(1) also provides, in 
pertinent part, that "[t]he Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money" and 
"prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such 
property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of 
his, her, or its tangible property...." The Legislature has implemented these 
constitutional provisions in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (8) and 59-2-103 (1). Section 59-
2-102 (9) defines the term "fair market value" to mean the amount at which property 
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts... 
." and Section 59-2-103 (1) provides that "[a]ll tangible taxable property shall be assessed 
and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on 
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January 1, unless otherwise provided by law." Accordingly, Utah law requires that 
Action's "rent-to-own" property be assessed and taxed at its fair market value. Actions 
asserts that the automatic application of the Commission's personal property valuation 
schedules, without consideration of the specific property or type of property being 
assessed, and its condition, fails to properly implement the standard of fair market value 
set forth in constitution and statute. Consequently, Action asserts that the Commission's 
five-year schedule fails to take into account the special factors involved with "rent-to-
own" property and, therefore, overvalues Action's "rent-to-own" property. 
Various sub-issues were presented and argued at the formal hearing which directly 
relate to the issue of value. The testimony and exhibits relevant to the issue of value were 
offered through these sub-issues. Action believes it will be most logical to discuss the 
facts and marshal the evidence supporting and detracting from the Commission's decision 
through an analysis of these sub-issues 
A. The Commission's Five-Year Schedule. 
Action argued that the Commission's five-year valuation schedule used to value its 
"rent-to-own" property was too long and resulted in the overvaluation of Action's 
property. Nonetheless, the Commission decided that its five-year schedule properly 
valued Action's "rent-to-own" property. The evidence supporting the Commission's 
decision primarily comes from the testimony of Mr. Liddle who testified that the 
Commission looks at IRS class life because it reflects the economic life or useful 
productive life of the property. TR. at 153-154. Mr. Liddle further testified that the 
Commission looks to class life and not to MACRS depreciation when determining 
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depreciation for valuation purposes because MARCS is an accelerated method that may 
be based upon Congress' attempting to accomplish some social purpose. R. at 847, 972, 
TR. at 153-154. The Assessor also introduced the testimony of Mr. Patrick and Mr. 
Tippets who testified that the Assessor followed the Commission's directives in valuing 
Action's "rent-to-own" property (TR. at 151-152) and that the Assessor valued Action's 
"rent-to-own" property based upon the property's wholesale cost applied against the 
Commission's Recommended Schedules For Personal Property Valuation. R. at 946-947, 
954-955, 960-961, 969-971, 973. From this testimony, the Commission could have 
concluded that the Assessor valued Action's "rent-to-own" property according to standard 
appraisal methodology for valuing personal property and could have further concluded 
that its valuation schedules were correct since they followed IRS class life tables which 
the Assessor's witnesses testified are intended to arrive at fair market value. R. at 891, 
929-930, 972-973, TR. at 154-155. 
In addition, the Assessor argued that the appraisal submitted by Mr. Jerry Erkelens 
did not value the subject property and was dated after the lien date. Based upon this 
argument, the Commission could have disregarded Mr. Erkelens' appraisal as being 
irrelevant to the issue of the value of the subject property. Finally, the Assessor's 
witnesses suggested that the useful life testified to by Action's valuation witnesses was 
the commercial useful life of the property, to Action, and not to the useful life of the 
property to Action's customers. R. at 871-872, 882, 911-912, 966, 969. The Commission 
could conclude from this fact that Action's witnesses were only valuing a portion of the 
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property and that there was some remaining useful life in the "rent-to-own" property that 
was not accounted for by Action's witnesses. 
Based upon a review of the whole record, the Commission's decision is not 
substantially supported, and it would be unreasonable for the Commission to conclude 
from the whole record that the Commission's five-year schedule properly valued Action's 
"rent-to-own" property. 
The record reflects that none of the Assessor's witnesses, including Mr. Patrick 
who supervised the person who performed the Action audit, and Mr. Tippets, Mr. 
Patrick's supervisor, physically viewed the subject property, performed an independent 
appraisal of Action's "rent-to-own" property, and have never performed an independent 
appraisal of "rent-to-own" property. R. at 954-956, 963, 969, 973. They also testified 
that the assessment of Action's "rent-to-own" property was based entirely upon 
application of the Commission's valuation schedule against Action's cost of the "rent-to-
own" property. R. at 946-947, 954-955, 969-971, 973. Based upon this testimony, the 
Commission should have concluded that the Assessor's witnesses had no basis to 
challenge the factual valuation testimony offered by Action's valuation witnesses, that 
they were incompetent to offer specific valuation testimony about Action's "rent-to-own" 
property or about "rent-to-own" property in general, and they were incompetent to testify 
concerning the condition of "rent-to-own" property in comparison to the Commission's 
schedule which purports to account for "severe wear and tear." Action offered as 
witnesses Mr. Erkelens and Mr. Thomas who were the only two witnesses certified by the 
Commission's hearing officer as expert valuation experts. They were, therefore, the only 
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witnesses competent to render opinions of value. In addition, Mr. Jones had worked in 
the "rent-to-own" industry for fourteen years and had gained insights and experience in 
valuing "rent-to-own" property. These three witnesses had greater knowledge and 
understanding concerning the useful life of "rent-to-own" property than any of the other 
witnesses. The Commission should have favored their testimony over the testimony of 
others who had never physically appraised "rent-to-own" property. In addition, Action 
offered a copy of the recommended decision of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization's hearing officer for the 1995 appeal of Action's "rent-to-own" property. In 
that recommended decision, the hearing officer recommended that the schedule used by 
the Salt Lake County Assessor to value Action's "rent-to-own" property "may be correct 
for property under typical daily usage, however, the appellant's property is not subject to 
typical wear and tear" and that Action "provided sufficient evidence to suggest the 
property should be classified into a different schedule . . . I will recommend the property 
be placed in Class I short-life property, a 3-year life schedule." R. at 984-985. 
With respect to Mr. Erkelens' appraisal, he was engaged by Action as an expert 
witness to value property similar to the "rent-to-own" property assessed by the Salt Lake 
County Assessor in the Action audit. R. at 806-810, 812-813, 816, 907-908. The 
personal property valued by Mr. Erkelens had been returned to Action following the 
expiration of a "rent-to-own" contract or a repossession. A review of the property 
included in the appraisal reveals that some of the property included in his appraisal was 
acquired by Action in 1994 and 1995 and may been included in the 1994 or 1995 
assessments of Action's "rent-to-own" property. Pet's Ex. No. 1. Mr. Erkelens testified 
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that he valued the personal property using a "market approach" to value based upon actual 
sales he had seen of similar personal property in his business. R. at 807-810, 812-813, 
823, 826-827. His appraisal was based upon the property's actual fair market value and 
not upon its liquidation value. His appraisal also considered the condition of, the demand 
for, and the obsolescence present in the personal property. R. at 813-814. The standard 
of fair market value used by Mr. Erkelens was "the price at which the property would 
exchange hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Neither being under 
compulsion to buy or compulsion to sell, both having reasonable knowledge." R. at 814. 
Mr. Erkelens appraisal valued all of Action's used "rent-to-own" property that had been 
"out" on "rent-to-own" contracts. The appraisal items were not merely a random 
sampling of such property. R. at 817-818. He described the personal property sold by 
rent-to-own businesses as "low end furniture" which would be the "least expensive 
furniture that's on the market today" and indicated that the quality of the furniture has an 
"impact on the value" and that "[i]t simply doesn't last as long. It wears out faster. It [is] 
used up much sooner than quality furniture." R. at 824-825. He observed the condition of 
most of the personal property to be "poor," "pretty beat up," "worthless," "destroyed," that 
"most of these items could be used for part[s] or a boat anchor," that [t]here's hardly 
anyone that would put any of this stuff in their house," and that it "was in real bad shape." 
R. at 816, 819-820, 827 (147-148?), 984. He estimated the useful life of the personal 
property valued to have been "18 months to two years/' R. at 819, 863. This observation 
and estimate was particularly true for the electronics items. R. at 820. Mr. Jones testified 
that the property appraised by Mr. Erkelens was similar to and typical of the "rent-to-
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own" property which was the subject of the 1989-1994 and 1995 assessments. Since Mr. 
Erkelens appraised actual "rent-to-own" property that was typical of the same kind of 
property included in the Action 1994 and 1995 assessments, the Commission should have 
placed great weight in his testimony concerning the quality of "rent-to-own" property and 
the condition of that property after it has been "out" on a "rent-to-own" contract. 
The Assessor attempted to argue through cross-examination of Action's witnesses 
that the value of "rent-to-own" property should be greater because it may sell for greater 
than fair market value, however, Mr. Erkelens questioned whether sales of "rent-to-own" 
property to subsequent buyers were arms-length sales because the price at which a "rent-
to-own" business may resell an item of personal property to a subsequent buyer may 
exceed the personal property's fair market value because such buyers are a "special group 
of buyer," which is not "a typical buyer," as they "are desperate to but the items," and 
"[a]typical buyer. . . would [not] pay as much as someone who can't go to R.C. Wiley 
and make monthly payments." R. at 825-826. The ultimate sale price of "rent-to-own" 
property may exceed the property's actual fair market value. R. at 879-882, 913-915. 
Based upon this testimony, the Commission should have disregarded the Assessor's 
attempts to show that "rent-to-own" property may have a greater value than that testified 
to by Action's valuation witnesses because it may have sold for a price that exceeds fair 
market value. The Commission should have concluded from Mr. Erkelens' testimony that 
these sales are tainted sales because they were not arms-length sales and do not represent 
the actual fair market value of the property. 
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Action also engaged Kent L. Thomas as an expert valuation witness. Mr. Thomas 
was a C.P.A. and had previously operated a competing "rent-to-own" business and had 
previously served as president of the "rent-to-own" industry's local trade association. R. 
829-832, 834. Mr. Thomas corroborated Mr. Erkelens' testimony concerning the fair 
market value of "rent-to-own" property and testified that in his expert opinion, "rent-to-
own" property "has a useful life of approximately 18 to 24 months." R. at 855, 858-861, 
863-867, 909, 928-929, TR. at 146-48. The Commission should have disregarded the 
inferences made by the Assessor that Action's valuation witnesses were not valuing the 
full value of the subject property. Mr. Thomas, Mr. Erkelens and Mr. Jones all testified 
concerning the condition of returned "rent-to-own" property and that much of it must be 
refurbished, sold at deep discount, or junked. Based upon this testimony, the 
Commission should have concluded that there was little, if any, useful life left in typical 
"rent-to-own" property to be used by the average consumer. In addition, the Commission 
should have understood from the testimony of Action's valuation witnesses that both IRS 
class life tables and the Commission's valuation schedules are purportedly based upon 
actual sales of commercial property in the market place. "Residential" personal property 
is generally not depreciable and is not subject to the property tax. When title to "rent-to-
own" property is transferred to a customer following full payment, the property becomes 
residential use property and is no longer subject to property tax. R. at 872, TR. at 148. 
"Commercial" personal property may be depreciated for income tax purposes and is 
subject to the property tax. Therefore, the IRS tables and the Commission's personal 
property schedules are based upon observances of commercial transactions, not of 
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residential transactions. Neither the IRS nor the Commission are affected by or monitor 
residential use, therefore, they do not measure residential use when attempting to value 
commercial property, {see Section 167 (a)(1) and (2), Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and 
Art. XIII, sec. 2 (8)(second clause)). It would be erroneous to assume that IRS useful life 
tables and Commission percent good tables reflect residential use of property that they do 
not tax. 
Dan Jones, the former president of Action, also testified concerning value based 
upon his fourteen years experience in a "rent-to-own" business. Mr. Jones corroborated 
the testimony of Mr. Erkelens and Mr. Thomas that "rent-to-own" property generally has 
an 18 to 24 month useful life. 
The Commission should have considered and heavily weighed the fact that the 
Assessor presented no evidence to controvert the testimony of Mr. Erkelens, Mr. Thomas 
or Mr. Jones concerning their opinion of fair market value of Action's "rent-to-own" 
property (R. at 954-956, 963-964, 969, 973, 974) and that the Assessor did not physically 
view Action's "rent-to-own" personal property or base its assessments upon an appraisal 
of the actual property. R. at 954-956, 963, 969, 973. 
Additional support for Action's argument comes from surveys offered through Mr. 
Thomas from 1994 and 1995 of "rent-to-own" businesses throughout the United States. 
(Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3.) R. at 838-839, 849. The surveys surveyed the type of 
depreciation used by "rent-to-own" companies for tax and financial accounting purposes. 
R. at 845-846. During the audit periods, the depreciation method required by the Internal 
Revenue Service for the type of personal property sold by "rent-to-own" businesses is the 
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Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System ("MACRS") which uses a five-year class 
life for such personal property. R. at 844-845. The survey identified five other 
depreciation methods used by the "rent-to-own" businesses surveyed for either tax or 
financial accounting purposes. R. at 840. Mr. Thomas testified that the purpose of 
financial accounting is to "match," under generally accepted principles of accounting, the 
cost recovery of assets through depreciation to the actual income generated so that there 
will be an accurate matching of income and expenses on the financial statements. R. at 
847. Mr. Thomas testified that although MACRS is the required method of tax 
depreciation for "rent-to-own" businesses, the 1994 and 1995 surveys reflect that for 
"rent-to-own" companies with 5-10 stores, only 8% actually used MACRS for tax 
accounting purposes and 92% of these companies used other methods. R. at 847-848. 
Pet's Ex. 2 and 3. Action itself used a 24-month, straight-line tax and financial 
accounting method for depreciation of its "rent-to-own" property and Mr. Thomas's "rent-
to-own" business used an 18-month, straight-line method for tax and financial accounting 
purposes. R. at 855. In response to Mr. Thomas1 testimony, the Assessor's witnesses 
testified that tax and financial accounting methods have little to do with fair market value, 
and Mr. Patrick testified that there is a difference between useful life and economic life. 
R. at 949-950, 969. Based upon this fact, the Commission could have disregarded this 
portion of Mr. Thomas1 testimony. However, for the Commission to disregard this 
portion of Mr. Thomas' testimony would be unreasonable in light of the rest of his 
testimony which dealt with the actual fair market value of "rent-to-own" property he had 
observed through working for a "rent-to-own" business. The fact that "rent-to-own" 
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businesses were using depreciation methods for tax and accounting purposes that differed 
from that directed by the IRS in order to better reflect the economic life of the property 
simply corroborates the other testimony by Mr. Thomas, Mr. Erkelens and Mr. Jones 
regarding the condition of and their opinion concerning the economic life of "rent-to-
own11 property. 
Mr. Thomas also testified concerning the actions taken by the Association of 
Progressive Rental Organizations ("APRO"), the "rent-to-own" industry's national trade 
association. Mr. Thomas testified that APRO was concerned that MACRS depreciation 
did not reflect the actual value of "rent-to-own" personal property and engaged in 
litigation with Internal Revenue Service and in lobbying Congress to change the 
depreciation method applicable to "rent-to-own" property so that such property more 
closely matches the economic life of the property. R. at 848-849, 893, Appendices D and 
E. 
B. Change In Law. 
Action indicated that the Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules For 
Personal Property Valuation basically follow IRS guidelines for the depreciation of 
property (R. at 891, TR. at 154-155) and that the Tax Commission puts great weight in 
IRS class life system. Mr. Liddle testified that if the IRS changed the class life for a 
particular type of property, the Tax Commission would give that change considerable 
weight in making any changes to its valuation schedules. R. at 891, 929-930, TR. at 154-
155. Action informed the Commission at the formal hearing that Congress had changed 
the law regarding the depreciation of "rent-to-own" property. R. at 983-984, Appendix D. 
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Internal Revenue Code Section 168 (e) was amended as part of the "Taxpayer Relief Act 
of 1997." The new law provides that "qualified rent-to-own property" is be classified as 
"3-year property" and have a "class life" of 4 years. R. at 848-849, 893, 983 (A copy of 
relevant pages from a publication reporting the changes to Sections 168 (e) and (g) was 
submitted to the Tax Commission at formal hearing. For some unknown reason, only one 
of those pages is included in Volume 4 of 4 of the Tax Commission's Record. A copy of 
the actual submission, as it was submitted to the Tax Commission on September 11, 
1997, is appended hereto as Appendix No. D and a more formal copy of relevant statutes 
from the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is appended hereto as Appendix No. E.) 
C. Wear and Tear. 
Action argued that its "rent-to-own" property was subject to significant wear and 
tear due to the nature of its customers. The Assessor observed that the Tax Commission's 
Recommended Schedules For Personal Property Valuation classify "rent-to-own" 
property in a class of property generally reserved for electronics equipment that is subject 
to rapid functional and economic obsolescence, or which has severe wear and tear. R. at 
959-960, 963, 969, 971-972. The Commission could conclude from this fact that the 
Commission's valuation schedules already account for the wear and tear suggested by 
Action. To accept the Assessor's testimony in light of the whole record would be 
unreasonable. Mr. Erkelens testified concerning the condition of the "rent-to-own" 
property that he appraised and described the personal property sold by rent-to-own 
businesses as "low end furniture" which would be the "least expensive furniture that's on 
the market today" and indicated that the quality of the furniture has an "impact on the 
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value" and that "[i]t simply doesn't last as long. It wears out faster. It [is] used up much 
sooner than quality furniture." R. at 824-825. He observed the condition of most of the 
personal property to be "poor," "pretty beat up," "worthless," "destroyed," that "most of 
these items could be used for part[s] or a boat anchor," that [fjhere's hardly anyone that 
would put any of this stuff in their house," and that it "was in real bad shape." R. at 816, 
819-820, 827 (147-148?), 984. Mr. Thomas testified that "rent-to-own" property, 
particularly the items which are returned to a "rent-to-own" dealer, is subject to "great 
wear and tear" as a result of "rent-to-own* customers having a more transient lifestyle. R. 
at 859-861, 882-883, 984. Finally, Mr. Jones testified that he had spent fourteen years in 
the "rent-to-own" industry and that the useful life of "rent-to-own" property is affected by 
the nature of the customer. He further testified that "rent-to-own" customers are generally 
"more abusive and maybe careless with the way they handle their property. Many of 
them have pets. Many of them smoke without a care for taking care of the product. 
Many of them are transient in nature and move - and they move themselves, they don't 
always use . . .good moving procedures, pickup trucks and things like that. There's 
definitely a higher abusive rate on all of our product." R. at 901-902, 984. He also 
testified that the typical "rent-to-own" customer has a below average income and has 
financial problems as a result of a bankruptcy, divorce, unemployment or other similar 
problems. R. at 901, 984. Half of "rent-to-own" customers are renters. R. at 901. These 
factors should have confirmed to the Commission that "rent-to-own" customers are 
transient and that there is a great likelihood that "rent-to-own" property will be damaged 
by frequent moves. Finally, Mr. Jones testified that Action also had a problem with 
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"skips" and "pawns" as customers would acquire product and pawn it, hide it and not pay, 
or leave the state with the product. R. at 902. The Commission should have concluded 
from these facts that there is great risk of loss in the "rent-to-own" industry and that 
Action would not be able to enjoy the economic benefit of some of its product. Under the 
Assessor's view, "rent-to-own" product that is stolen, pawned or destroyed will still be 
considered Action's property and subjected to a property tax until Action can verify that 
the product is permanently lost. Action may be unable to do that. 
The Commission is required to review the whole record and make findings that 
support its decision. Morton Int'L v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). Based upon a review of the record described above, the 
Commission's decision that Action's "rent-to-own" property is properly valued using a 
five-year schedule is unreasonable and is not substantially supported by the whole record. 
Consequently, this Court should reverse the Commission's decision and order the 
Commission to value Action's "rent-to-own" property based upon a two or three-year 
class life rather than a five-year class life. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
With respect to Action's first issue, Action can be subjected to an "escaped 
property" assessment only if the facts of the case demonstrate that one of the 
circumstances described in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102 (8)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) is found to 
be present. The Commission's Final Decision fails to make adequate findings or 
conclusions and fails to articulate any reason for determining that Action's "rent-to-own" 
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property is "escaped property" within the meaning of the statute. Although this issue 
presents a question of law and is reviewable under a correction of error standard, a review 
of the whole reflects that the Commission's decision is not substantially supported by the 
record. Action clearly complied with all reporting requirements imposed upon it and 
entertained a good faith belief concerning the proper application of Utah law. Because 
Action was consistent in its reporting over an extended period of time, and because there 
was significant confusion and difference of opinion among those administering and those 
complying with the law, it would be inappropriate and inequitable to impose an "escaped 
property" assessment against Action, particularly, where the other members of the "rent-
to-own" industry will not be subject to the same treatment. With respect to this issue, 
Action asks this Court to reverse the Commission's decision that Action's "rent-to-own" 
property was "escaped property" and order Salt Lake County to dismiss the "escaped 
property" portion of the 1989-1994 assessment and refund Action's money attributable to 
that portion of the assessment, with interest. 
With respect to Action's second issue concerning the fair market value of Action's 
"rent-to-own" property, the Commission failed to make adequate findings and 
conclusions to allow Action to properly challenge its decision. Notwithstanding the 
infirmity in the Commission's Final Decision, Action has marshaled the evidence in the 
record, citing and discussing facts from the record on both sides of the issue, and Action 
has demonstrated that the Commission's decision is not substantially supported by the 
whole record. In light of the Commission's failure to provide adequate findings and 
conclusions, this Court should grant no deference to the Commission's decision that "the 
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five year [sic] class life established in the Recommended Schedules for Personal Property 
Valuation is the proper valuation method for the subject property" and based upon the 
marshaled evidence, this Court should reverse the Commission's decision and hold that it 
was unreasonable for the Commission not to adopt a two or three-year class life for "rent-
to-own" property. Therefore, Action asks this Court to reverse the Commission's decision 
concerning the value of "rent-to-own" property and order the Commission to either value 
Action's "rent-to-own" property as Class I, Short-life, three-year property or create a new 
valuation class for "rent-to-own" using a two-year class life. This Court should also order 
a refund of Action's money, with interest, based upon the difference between the two or 
three-year class life and the five-year class life applied by the Assessor in the 1989-1994 
and 1995 assessments. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of August, 199&. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Buchi V 
Thorup 
Steven P. Young 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Petitioner to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 14th day of August, 1998, to the 
following: 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Salt Lake County Division of Legal Counsel 
2001 South State S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT/i 84190 
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Appendix A 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision of Tax Commission 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
/OO I I 
ACTION TV, ACTON TV & RENTAL, ) 
Petitioner, 
v. 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CO^CliDSlO^S OF UflS, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 96-0917 
96-2215 
Account Nos. 24-079300 
01-076272 
21-0079305 
Tax Type: Personal Property 
STATEMENT QF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a 
Formal Hearing on September 11, 1997. W. Val Oveson, Commission 
Chairman, and Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge, heard the matter 
for and on behalf of the Commission. Present and representing 
Petitioner wa£ Gary Thorup, Esq., of Holme Roberts & Owen. Present 
and representing Respondent was Mary Ellen Sloan, Deputy County 
Attorney. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The tax in question is personal property tax. 




3. The property at issue are the items of personal property 
which were owned by Petitioner but as of the respective lien dates 
were subject to rent to own contracts. These items vJere for the 
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most part furniture, appliances and electronic devices. These 
items were generally in the possession of the lessee on the lien 
date. However, title remained with Petitioner. No portion of the 
assessment at issue came from the furniture, appliances and 
electronic devices which were at Petitioner's business locations on 
the lien dates and were not subject to rent to own contracts. 
4. Petitioner had not claimed the subject items of personal 
property on its property tax affidavits for the years in question. 
5. In May 1994, the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office 
completed an audit of Petitioner's business establishments within 
Salt Lake County. As a result of the audit the County imposed an 
escaped property tax assessment for the subject property for the 
years 1989 to 1994. Subsequently Petitioner filed an appeal of its 
199 5 personal property assessment and the two appeals have been 
consolidated by the Tax Commission. The County's assessments were 
based on Petitioner's cost for the items of property at issue 
multiplied by the percent good tables as established by the Tax 
Commission in its Recommended Schedules For Personal Property 
Valuation. The percent good was based on a five year class life. 
6. Petitioner is in the business of leasing, with a 
possibility for eventual purchase, furniture, appliances and 
electronic devices. Approximately 90% of Petitioner's revenue 
comes from leasing the items by "rent to own" contracts. At the 
end of the rent to own contract, if the lessee/customer had made 
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all the payments, then title would pass to the lessee/customer. 
However, lessee/customers often did not make all of the payments 
and the leased items would be returned to Petitioner who would 
generally re-lease the items. A small percentage of Petitionees 
revenue came from out right retail sales of furniture, appliances 
or electronics and a small percentage from "rent to rent" contracts 
whereby there was no provision that the lessee would own the item 
at the end of the contract. 
7. Petitioner generally disposed of the items at issue 
within three years of acquiring them, either through one or more 
rent to own contracts, outright sales, or as a write off due to 
theft or poor condition. 
8. During the period in question rent-to-own businesses did 
not uniformly report or value items of personal property on their 
personal property affidavits. The County did not audit personal 
property affidavits of other rent-to-own businesses. The result 
being that many of these business paid less in property tax than 
the legally required amount and less then the amount being assessed 
against Petitioner. 
9. Lessee/customers of Petitioner testified at the hearing 
that they usually intended to keep the items for which they entered 
into the rent-to-own contracts and they continued to use these 
items after they acquired title from Petitioner by paying the 
amount required in the rent-to-own contract. 
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APPLICABLE LAW 
The Utah Legislature has provided the Counties the authority 
to assess property tax on escaped property. Escaped property is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(7) as follows: 
(a) "Escaped Property" means any property, 
whether personal, land or any improvements to 
the property, subject to taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, 
assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed 
to the wrong taxpayer by the assessing 
authority: 
(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls 
because of the failure of the taxpayer to 
comply with the reporting requirements of this 
chapter; or 
(iii) undervalued because of errors made by 
the assessing authority based upon incomplete 
or erroneous information furnished by the 
taxpayer. 
(b) Property which is undervalued because of 
the uses of a different valuation methodology 
or because of a different application of the 
same valuation methodology is not "escaped 
property." 
Inventory is exempt from property tax pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §59-2-1114 as follows: 
(1) Tangible personal property present in Utah 
on the assessment date, at noon, held for sale 
in the ordinary course of business . . . and 
which constitutes the inventory or any 
retailer, wholesaler, distributor, processor, 
warehouseman, manufacturer, producer, 
gatherer, transporter, storage provider, 
farmer or livestock raiser, is exempt from 
property taxation . . . 
(3) (b) "Inventory" means all items of tangible 
personal property described as materials, 
containers, goods in process, finished goods, 
severed minerals, and other personal property 
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owned by or in possession of the person 
claiming the exemption, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The subject property at issue assessed by Respondent for 
the years 19 89 through 1994 was escaped property pursuant to the 
definition set out in Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(7). 
2. The subject property is not exempt as inventory from 
property tax. Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1114. 
3. The subject property is properly valued as having a five 
year life by following the Recommended Schedules For Personal 
Property Valuation promulgated by the Utah State Tax Commission. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Three issues were presented to the Commission by the 
Petitioner in this matter. For the first issue, Petitioner argues 
that the subject property does not meet the statutory definition of 
escaped property set out in Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102(7). The Tax 
Commission disagrees with this argument as it finds that the 
subject property is clearly "escaped property" within the meaning 
of the statute, and therefore, Respondent had the authority to 
issue the property tax assessment for the years 1989 through 1994. 
The second issue presented by Petitioner is wether or not the 
subject property is exempt from property tax as inventory/ pursuant 
to the exemption established in the Utah Constitution or codified 
in Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1114. After reviewing the law at issue and 
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the information presented by the parties at the hearing, the Tax 
Commission agrees with Respondent that the subject property is not 
inventory within the meaning of the statute or the Utah 
Constitution. 
The third issue then, is since the Commission has found the 
property at issue to be subject to property tax, should value be 
based on a three year or a five year class life. The Commission 
determines from the evidence presented that the five year class 
life established in the Recommended Schedules for Personal Property 
Valuation is the proper valuation method for the subject property. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission sustains the 
escaped property valuation for the years 1989 through 1994 and the 
value set by the County for 1995. It is so ordered. 
DATED this j V day of Aj^UJl^W , 1990. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Jane Pnan 
Administrative Lav/ Judge 
-6-
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The agency has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur 
in this decision. 
DATED this /7 day of ^\^YU(AM\, , 199*. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 




RiJchard B. McKjeown 
Commi s s i one r 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order 
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you 
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you 
have thirty (30) days after the date of a final order to file a 
Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court. (Utah 
Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah Code Ann. §63-46(b)-l et. 
seq.) 
JKP/Q6-09l7fof 
PLEASE NOTE: If this Order results in tax liability, failure to pay 
within thirty (30) days of this Order may subject Petitioner to 
additional penalty pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 59-1-401(2)(d). 
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Thorup, Gary 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Holme Roberts & Owen 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 1100 
SLC UT 84111 
Gardner, Lee A. 
JRespondent 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
2001 South State N2300 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 1300 
Reed, Mike 
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Salt Lake County Auditor 
2001 South State N2200 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
Hendrickson, Karl 
Affected County 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State S3600 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
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Tax Administrator 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
APPEALS DIVISION 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Action TV, : Appeal Nos. 96-0917 & 
Petitioner, : 96-2215 
vs. : 
Utah StateJTax Commission : HEARING 
Respondent,. - : 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on September 11, 1997, 
the preceding case was heard before Judge Jane Phan, 
and that the following is a true and correct 
transcript of said Hearing. 
I 
eponisx 
REPORTING SERVICES, LLC 
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cost to you and 
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Page 146| 
through and talk about the actual 
the ultimate purchase price. Is it 
or all of these people became owners 
Right. 
By actually purchasing it? In 
were also asked concerning the useful 
erty. Now isn't it true that normally 
you don't see property if it's purchased after the 





they can't affor 
ecause it's retained by the customer? 
I can't recall ever seeing property. 
So when is it that you do see the 
Well, if the customer decides that 
d i-t at that time, they would return 
it after the first rental period or the second and 
some cases third 
Mr. Thorpe: 
• 
Okay. So your comments about the 
useful life of the property is your visual inspection 
of the property 
the second aft 
that is returned to Action TV after 
er the first, second or sometimes even 
third Rent-to-Own contract, and not where it's 
retained by the 
Mr. Jones: 
Mr. Thorpe: 
customer. Is that correct? 
That's correct. 
And your opinion is that the 




























property that you've seen returned has a useful 
economic life of no more than two to three years. Is 
that correct? 
Mr. Jones: No more than two years I mean I 
don't you have to see the product. 
Mr. Thorpe: Tell us about some of "them. 
Mr. Jones: Well, I mean, it's hard to imagine, I 
mean but when this appraiser came and I took him 
around to the stores we try to sell off our stuff 
rather quickly once its you know becomes you 
know a little bit beat up or in some cases too 
soiled or too bad. We do throw it away, but most the 
times we just try to cash it out. 'Cause we went 
around and looked for used product that - we found 
you know doors are- hanging off, the whole hinge off 
of the front of the washing machine is just it's got 
a huge dent in it its hanging out. Knobs are 
missing. You know the way a lot of the stuff not 
all but a lot of it comes back, the value of it, the 
average customer - you and I Joe Public - we 
wouldn't want that in our homes. We would be 
embarrassed to have that, we would go and buy it 
somewhere else. And the value just goes down and down 
because it's beat up. 
Mr. Thorpe: So, Mr. Erkelens' comment that a lot 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
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non-taxable anyway, doesn't 
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Jones: 
Thorpe 
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read the first j 
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1 | four or five lines. Could you please start reading? 
2 | It' s 
Mr. Jones: Tell me where. 
4 I Mr. Thorpe: Right down here. Its 59-2-306? 
5 Chairman Oveson: That's correct, in subsection 
6 one. 
7 Mr. Jones: Okay. The County Assessor may 
8 J request a signed statement in affidavit form from any 
9 I person setting forth all the real and personal 
10 property assessable by the assessor which is owned, 
11 possessed, managed or under the control of the person 
12 at 12:00 noon on January 1. 
13 Mr. Thorpe: Okay, let's go back to the third 
14 line. What was that word what kind of property are 
15 you supposed to report? 
16 Mr. Jones: Personal property. 
17 Mr. Thorpe: Which is? 
18 Mr. Jones: Assessable. 
19 Mr. Thorpe: Assessable by the assessor. So it 
20 does talk in terms of whether or not the property is 
21 taxable. 
22 Mr. Jones: Right. 
23 Mr. Thorpe: And you were aware of that when you 
24 filed your return. 
2 5 Mr. J o n e s : R i g h t . 



























right. Mr. L 
? Do you sol 
testimony you 




can do that, 
Ms. Sloan: 
































shot my wad with the 
ot a CPA. 
Then you 
is my fina 
Then we' 
Mr. Denny : 
may have a 
1 witness. 





Liddle at this 
he right outside? Okay. 
you raise your right 





to give is 
the truth 
a seat. 
if you wou 
or stand, either way. 






Id like to sit, 
please state 
your place of employment. 
Denny Liddle, Utah State Tax 
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Commission, Property Tax Division. 
Ms. Sloan: And what do you do in your 
occupation? 
Mr. Liddle: Assistant Director over the Property 
Tax Division. 
Ms. Sloan: Are you familiar with personal 
property taxation and Rent-to-Own contracts? 
Mr. Liddle: Yes, to some degree. 
Ms. Sloan: Are you familiar with the Division's 
policy regarding the taxation of property which is 
subject to Rent-to-Own contracts? 
Mr. Liddle: Yes. 
Ms. Sloan: And what is Division's policy? 
Mr. Liddle: To follow the Administrative Rule. 
Ms. Sloan: And-what is the Administrative Rule? 
Mr. Liddle: Currently, it is that for property 
that is out on rent January 1st, it is taxable for 
anything that is sitting on the floor that can be 
either sold or rented, that that is exempt. 
Ms. Sloan: And, how what is your experience 
and how are the assessors expected to administer that 
Rule? 
Mr. Liddle: By affidavit from declaration of the 
tax payer. Personal property is a self-assessing 
affidavit throughout most of the State, so the tax 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
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payer is expected to complete that process. 
Ms. Sloan: So, pursuant to Tax Commission Rule, 
then, if it is property held for rent or (inaudible) 
it is taxable, even if it is rented? Is that correct? 
Mr. Liddle: Please restate that question. There 
are actually two parts to that one part specifically 
for Rent-to-Own and one part that deals more with 
rent-to-rent. 
Ms. Sloan: Well, we're dealing with Rent-to-Own 
primarily. If you could again state what the policy 
is or the ruling (inaudible). 
Mr. Liddle: If it's out on rent as of January 
1st, on a Rent-to-Own contract, it's taxable. If it 
is sitting on the floor and not out, it's exempt. 
Ms. Sloan: Are you familiar with what is called 
a TC595 form? 
Mr. Liddle: Yes; 
Ms. Sloan: And how are those used? 
Mr. Liddle: They are not. 
Ms. Sloan: They are not used currently? 
Mr. Liddle: That's correct. 
Ms. Sloan: And what was their use initially? 
Mr. Liddle: It was a method I'm not sure where 
the TC595 came from it was in place when I came to 
this position. I know that it was little used by tax 



























payers or counties. The what TC595 tried to do, 
though, was also tax a portion of the property that 
sat on the Rent-to-Own company's floor, to determine 
what portion of that would be rented and what portion 
would be sold outright. And to also tax that 
inventory, even though it wasn't out on a Rent-to-Own 
contract. That's what the TC595 attempted to do. 
Ms. Sloan: Why is it not used? 
Mr. Liddle: It was done away with partly to 
increase consistency of administration within the 
counties. It wasn't being used, we had not real 
method to enforce it, and after examining statute and 
rule, we decided that probably the most consistent way 
to administer the program would be to give the 
taxpayer the benefit -of the doubt and assume that all 
that property that was sitting on the showroom floor 
would be sold outright. Because we had no real way of 
knowing which of that would be rented and which would 
be sold. 
Ms. Sloan: And so that would be exempt if it was 
sitting to be sold outright? Is that correct? 
Mr. Liddle: Correct. 
Ms. Sloan: Is there a difference between the IRS 
class life and the IRS depreciation for income tax 
25 I p u r p o s e s ' 









What is the difference? 
For income tax purp 
understanding, is that it accelerated 
oses, it is my 
depreciation to 
a level allowed by the IRS. The class life or what we 
consider is economic life to be the useful productive 
life of that equipment. 
Ms . Sloan: 





And that would be to 
Correct. 
And you gave the or 
Tax Division (inaudible) Commission's 
the person that 
does the Property 
schedule 
regarding the classification of property recognized by 
IRS (inaudible)? 
Mr. Liddle: We do to the degree 





combine various class-lifes 
We would have hundreds of 
use all of the IRS class lif 
to a just simplified for the 
administrative purposes as much as po 
possible? We 
em. We do not 
into one 
schedules if we 
es. But they 
taxpayer and for 
ssible, while 
still maintaining the integrity of the valuation 
system. So they 
on the IRS class 
J M s . Sloan: 
don't match exactly, 
lifes. 
Had you ever stated 
but we do rely 
that the that 
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in your view the Commission would change the class 
life if the IRS did? 
Mr. Liddle: My recollection of that is that that 
any time that the IRS changes a class life, we give 
that considerable weight in making any changes to our 
schedules. It would be the overriding factor, but we 
would give it weight. Yes. 
Ms. Sloan: So, just the fact that they made 
changes it would not per se result in an action 
where you would change or the Commission would change 
class life? 
Mr. Liddle: No. Because, as I explained before, 
there are various class lifes that fit within each of 
our schedules. We have a simplified system over what 
they have. 
Ms. Sloan: If the IRS changed the MACRS or ACRS, 
I guess (inaudible) class life, would that affect the 
situation? 
Mr. Liddle: I'm not even really fully aware of 
MACRS and ACRS. We do not rely on that for anything 
that we do in the schedule building. We consider that 
for income tax purposes and has no real reference to 
the valuation procedure. 
Ms. Sloan: Thank you. 
Judge Phan: Mr. Thorpe? 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
I, RITA MORGAN, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 through 224, 
contain a true and accurate transcript of the 
electronically recorded proceedings held in 
connection with Action TV vs. Utah State Tax 
Commission held on September 11, 1997. And was 
transcribed by me to the best of my ability from the 
cassette tapes furnished to me. 
Dated this 22nd day of May, 1998. 
RITA MORGAN, Transcriber 
I, RENEE L. STACY, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter 
and Notary Public for the State of Utah, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing transcript prepared by 
RITA MORGAN was transcribed under my supervision and 
d i r e c t i o n . 
T&1UJUG(. StiJbo^ 
RENEE L . STACY, CSRj 
. . \ A * 5 3 2 * * 
My Commission expires: \ fcu 
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Salt Lake County Advisory Ruling Request on "Rent-to-Own" Property 
#58543 
96-105DJ 
June 17, 1996 Advisory Opinion Request 
July 10, 1996 Response from the Tax Commission 
June 17,1996 
Val Oveson, Chairman 
Utah State Tax Commission 
210 North 1950 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
RE: Request for Advisory Opinion 
Dear Commissioner Oveson, 
The Salt Lake County Assessor's Office is requesting an advisory opinion from the Tax 
Commission regarding personal property tax assessments on firms engaged in the 
"Rent-to-Own" industry. It has come to light that firms involved in this type of transaction are 
reporting their taxable property using various methodologies, resulting in unequal assessments 
for similarly situated taxpayers. There are also pending appeals on this issue for 1994 at the state 
level and for 1995 at the local level. 
The businesses in question rent electronics, furniture, appliances, and other household items to 
individuals on a month-to-month or week-to-week basis. The renter can become the owner of the 
property upon completion of a specified number of payments, but title to the property remains 
with the business until all purchase options have been completed. The renter can return the 
property at the end of any rental period without further obligation as long as rental payments are 
up to date. No interest is charged, but the total price to the customer if he completes the full 
agreement is much higher than a regular retail purchase to account for the extra risk involved in 
the transaction. A copy of an agreement used by a local firm is attached. It is representative of 
the contract used by other businesses in this industry. 
The argument has been made by the taxpayer that the property subject to this type of agreement 
is exempt as inventory because the intent of the parties is that the renter eventually becomes the 
owner. However, Rule 884-24P-33, paragraph "D," states: 
"D. Other taxable personal property that is not included in the listed classes includes: 
1. Supplies on hand as of January 1 at 12:00 noon, including office supplies, shipping supplies, 
maintenance supplies, replacement parts, lubricating oils, fuel and consumable items not held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business. Supplies are assessed at total cost, including freight-in. 
2. Equipment leased or rented from inventory is subject to ad valorem tax. Refer to the 
appropriate property class schedule to determine taxable value. 
3. Property held for rent or lease is taxable and is not exempt as inventory. Entities engaged in a 
combination of direct sales, leases or rental, or rent-to-own may establish an exemption for 
inventory by filing form TC-595 with the county assessor in the county where the property has 
situs by February 1." (Emphasis added) 
In light of the above administrative rule, we would appreciate an advisory opinion regarding the 
following questions: 
1. Is the personal property which is in a customer's possession but still owned by the 
business and subject to a rent-to-own contract, taxable or exempt from ad valorem 
personal property tax in Utah? Are there any distinctions to be made for property subject 
to a "rent-to-own" agreement versus property subject to purely a rental or lease 
agreement? 
2. If taxable, at what level of trade should the property be reported to the assessor; the 
historical cost to the merchant, the value placed on the property pursuant to the 
rent-to-own contract, or the normal retail price of the item if purchased through 
conventional means? 
3. In establishing an exemption for "inventory" the taxpayer may file form TC-595 with the 
county assessor. We would appreciate an explanation of each line item of the form and 
what values from the taxpayer's financial statements should be used for each. A copy of 
the TC-595 form is attached. 
1. Merchandise on Hand January 1, 19 _ 
2. Total Utah Sales 19 _ 
3. Total line 1 and line 2 
4. Total Utah leased or rentals 19 _ 
5. Taxable Inventory (divide line 4 by line 3) 
A. Does "merchandise on hand" only include that property which is not subject to a 
rental agreement, or does it have a broader meaning to include all "inventory" the 
merchant owns, including that subject to rental agreements? 
B. What does the word "Sales" mean in this context? Is this just the revenue from 
outright sales, or does it include rental revenue from those contracts "paying off 
within a certain period of time, or all rental income from each contract which pays off 
within the past calendar year? 
C. Why are lines 1 and 2 added together? 
D. What does "Total Utah leased or rentals" mean? 
E. Upon calculation of the exemption percentage, to what amount or line does it 
apply? 
4. Paragraph three of the Administrative Rule states, "Property held for rent or lease is 
taxable, and is not exempt as inventory." Please explain what is meant by "held for 
rent or lease." 
5. For those customers who complete the required number of payments to assume 
ownership during any year, or have rented for some period and then pay a lump sum 
to become the owner of the property, is this counted as "rental income" or "sales 
income" on the TC-595 form? 
6. According to the TC-595 form, if a firm receives more revenue from rental than from 
direct sales, as is the case with the rent-to-own industry, the taxable percent of 
inventory is greater than 100%. Applying this percentage to the inventory figure 
would result in more than 100% of the inventory being taxable. See Example A. 
7. What is the proper classification for rent-to-own property; the class based on the 
description of the property, Class 3 (small equipment rentals), or Class l(or some 
other value) based on the higher abuse the taxpayers claims the equipment receives? 
Since the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office has had to deal with this issue with several 
rent-to-own companies, we have interpreted the administrative rule and TC-595 form as follows: 
The rule specifically states that property leased or rented from inventory is subject to ad valorem 
tax. We take this to include "rent-to-own" property as well, and do not differentiate from short 
term rentals (one or two days) versus the longer term "rent-to-own" agreements. It is our opinion 
that form TC-595 form is used to establish an exemption from taxation based on the percent of 
total revenue attributed to outright sale of product for the previous calendar year. This calculation 
needs four components: the total inventory of the merchant (this would include all property on 
hand as of Jan 1 and would include property on rent, since that property has not yet been sold), 
gross revenue from the prior year derived from the outright sale of merchandise (should not 
include any rental income in any form), the gross revenue from all forms of rental for the prior 
year, and the total of the sales and rental revenue. Dividing the sales revenue and rental revenues 
by the total revenue will give a percent, which when applied back against the inventory figure 
will result in the amount of inventory exempt and taxable. 
The amount of property exempted will differ greatly if "merchandise on hand" is interpreted to 
exclude property subject to rental agreements. Including property subject to rental contracts will 
allow the exemption calculation to apply to inventory out on rent to account for the eventual sale 
of this property. It is our opinion that the TC-595 form in its present format does not yield a 
result which is accurate, logical, or mathematically correct. 
In the alternative to a confusing and easily misinterpreted TC-595 form, might we suggest an 
easier and more understandable methodology for both parties. Exempt property for a rent-to-own 
establishment would be property on the floor or warehoused which is awaiting sale or rental as of 
Jan 1 of any year. Taxable property would then only be that property subject to a rental 
agreement as of the same date. This information is readily available from the firm's financial 
records as of the year end. However, this methodology would treat rent-to-own firms differently 
from the short-term equipment rental firms where all the inventory is taxable because it is all 
"held for rent." 
An advisory opinion on this issue would assist this office and other assessors statewide to 
uniformly assess this property. Taxpayers and assessing personnel have interpreted the rule and 
the form quite differently since no instructions or definitions have been set forth for their 
implementation and the TC-595 form in its present format yields incorrect results. A revised TC 
595 form is attached, which yields what we believe to be the correct exemption percentage. 
Sincerely, 
XXXXX 
July 10, 1996 
XXXXX 
Re: Advisory opinion request 
Dear XXXXX 
We have received your request for an advisory opinion on the taxation of property 
leased under a "rent to own agreement." Although you raise an interesting issue, you also 
mention that this issue is being raised in two appeals; one that is before the Commission and one 
that may come to us in the future on appeal from the county's decision. If we accepted your 
advisory opinion request, we would, in effect, be allowing you to argue your case outside the 
appeals process while denying the petitioner an opportunity to respond. Therefore, it is our 
policy to decline to issue an advisory opinion on any matter that is pending before the 
Commission on appeal. We think you will agree that the appeal process is a much better forum 
for addressing these matters and for allowing all parties in interest an opportunity to be heard. 
We regret that we are unable to fulfill this request. We hope the appeal decisions in 
question will be helpful to you. 




Internal Revenue Code Section 168(e) and (g) as submitted to the Tax Commission 
627 
CODE SECTIONS ADDED, AMENDED OR REPEALED BY THE 
TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997, THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT 
OF 1997, AND THE TAXPAYER BROWSING PROTECTION ACT 
OF 1997. 
The law as amended by the Taxpayer Relief Ad of 1997 (P.L 105-34), the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 (P.L 105-33). and the Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act of 1997 (P L 
105-35) is shown below For your convenience, all three laws are presented in one consolidated 
section Amendments from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 have no headings. Amendments 
from the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 arc listed under the heading "Balanced Budget Act " 
Amendments from the Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act of 1997 are listed under the 
heading "Taxpayer Browsing Act " 
It 5001] CODE SEC. 1. TAX I M P O S E D . 
* • * 
(h) MAXIMUM CAPITAL GAINS RATE — 
(1) IN GENERAL —If a taxpayer has a net capital gain for any taxable year, the tax imposed by this 
section for such taxable year shall not exceed the sum of— 
(A) a tax computed at the rates and in the same manner as if this subsection had not been 
enacted on the greater of— 
(i) taxable income reduced by the net capital gain, or 
(it) the lesser of— 
(I) the amount of taxable income taxed at a rate below 28 percent, or 
(II) taxable income reduced by the adjusted net capital gain, plus 
(D) 25 percent of the excess (if any) of— 
(i) the unrecaptured section 1250 gam (or, if less, the net capital gain), over 
(ii) the excess (if any) of— 
(I) the sum of the amount on which tax is determined under subparagraph (A) 
plus the net capital gam, over 
(II) taxable income, plus 
(C) 28 percent of the amount of taxable income m excess of the sum of— 
(i) the adjusted net capital gain, plus 
(ii) the sum of the amounts on which tax is determined under subparagraphs (A) and 
(B), plus 
(D) 10 percent of so much of the taxpayer's adjusted net capital gain (or, if less, taxable 
income) as does not exceed the excess (if any) of— 
(i) the amount of taxable income which would (without regard to this paragraph) be 
taxed at a rate below 28percent, over 
(ii) the taxable income reduced by the adjusted net capital gain, plus 
(E) 20 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted net capital gain (or, if less, taxable income) in 
excess of the amount on which a tax is determined under subparagraph (D). 
(2) RELXCED CAPITAL GAIN RATES FOR Ql ALIFIED 5-YEAR GAIN.— 
(A) REDICTIONIN 10-PERCENT RATE.—In the case of any taxable year beginning after December 
31, 2000, the rate under paragraph (1)(D) shall be 8 percent with respect to so much of the 
amount to which the 10-percent rate would otherwise apply as does not exceed qualified 5-year 
gain, and 10 percent with respect to the remainder of such amount. 
(B) REDI CTWNIN 20-PERCENT RATE.—The rate under paragraph (1)(E) shall be 18 percent with 
respect to so much of the amount to which the 20-percent rate would otherwise apply as does not 
exceed the lesser of— 
Code Sec. 1(h) 1J5001 
Hf 5075] CODE SEC. 168. ACCELERATED COST RECOVERY SYSTEM. 
* * • 
(e) CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY.—For purposes of thib section— 
* * * 
(3) CLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN PROPERTY.— 
(A) 3-YEAR PROPERTY.—The term "3-year property" includes— 
(i) any race horse which is more than 2 years old at the time it is placed in service, 
(ii) any horse other than a race horse which is more than 12 years old at the time it is 
placed in service, and 
(Hi) any qualified rent-to-own property. 
* * * 
Amendment Notes The above amendment applies to property placed in 
Act Sec. I086(bXl) amended Code Sec. 168(eX3XA) by service after the date of the enactment of this Act. 
striking "and" at the end of clause (i), by striking the period 
at the end of clause (ii) and inserting ". and", and by adding 
at the end a new clause (iii) to read as above. 
Appendix E 
Formal Copy of Internal Revenue Code Section 168(e) and (g) 
4 7 3 8 1986 Code—Subtitle Af Ch. IB, Part VI 9-97 
(A) HALF-YEAR CONVENTION.—The half-year convention is a convention which treat* all 
property placed in service during any taxable year (or disposed of during any taxable year) as 
placed in service (or disposed of) on the mid-point of such taxable year. 
(B) MlD-MONTH CONVENTION.—The mid-month convention ib a convention which treats all 
property placed in service during any month (or disposed of during any month) as placed in 
service (or disposed ol) on the mid-point of such month. 
(C) MID-QUARTER CONVENTION.—The mid-quarter convention is a convention which treats 
all property placed in service during any quarter of a taxable year (or disposed of during any 
quarter of a taxable year) as placed in service (or disposed of) on the mid-point of such quarter. 
Amendments Act Sec. 1002(aX23XB) provides* 
P.L. 100-647. § 1002(aX5)- (B) Clause (ii) of section 168(dX3XB) of the 1986 Code (as 
Act Sec 1002(aX5) amended Code Sec. I68(dX3XAX0 by added by subparagraph (A)) shall apply to taxable years 
striking out "and which are" after "applies". Prior to amend- beginning after March 31, 1988, unless OK- taxpayer elects 
menu Code Sec. 168(dX3XAX"0 read as follows at such time and in such manner as the Secretary of the 
(i) the aggregate bases of property to which this section Treasury or his delegate may prescribe, to have such clause 
applies and which are placed in service during the last 3 apply to taxable years beginning on or before such date, 
months of the taxable year, exceed
 p L lQQjM7 e 1002(iX2XD) 
The above amendment is effective as if included in the 
provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514) to Act Sec. 1O020X2XD) amended Code Sec 168(dX2) by 
which it relates. striking out "and" at the end of subparagraph (A), by 
P.L. 100-647, § 1002(aX23XA): inserting "and" at the end of subparagraph (B), and by 
Act Sec. I002(aX23XA) amended Code Sec. 168(dX3XB) inserting after subparagraph (B) a new subparagraph (C) to 
to read as above. Prior to amendment. Code Sec. 168(dX3XB) r e a d ^ a b o v e -
read as follows
 P L . 100-647, § 10020X2XE). 
( B ) CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.— „ ,. . ^ ^ - w ^ v r - v J J ^ , ^ , , , w , w « w v 
For purposes of subparagraph (A), nonresidential real prop-
 u ^ *?*• 10020X2XE) amended Code Sec 168(dX3XBX0 
erty and residential rental property shall not be taken into by striking out residential rental property and inserting in 
account u t " e r e o ' residential rental property and railroad grading 
The above amendment is generally effective as if 
included in the provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 The above amendments are effective as if included in 
( P X . 99-514) to which it relates. However, for a special the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 
effective date, see Act Sec. 1002(aX23XB), below. 99-514) to which they relate. 
[Sec. 168(e)] 
(e) CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY.—For purposes of this section— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, property shall be classified 
under the following table: 
If such property has a class life 
Property shall be treated as: (in years) of 
3-year property 4 or less 
5-year property : More than 4 but less than 10 
7-year property 10 or more but less than 16 
10-year property 16 or more but less than 20 
15-year property 20 or more but less than 25 
20-year property 25 or more. 
(2) RESIDENTIAL RENTAL OR NONRESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY.— 
(A) RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTY.— 
(i) RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTY.—The term "residential rental property" means 
any building or structure if 80 percent or more of the gross rental income from such building 
or structurefor the taxable year is rental income from dwelling units. 
(ii) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of clause (i)— 
(I) the term "dwelling unit" means a house or apartment used to provide living 
accommodations in a building or structure, but does not include a unit in a hotel, motel, 
or other establishment more than one-half of the units in which are used on a transient 
basis, and 
(II) if any portion of the building or structure is occupied by the taxpayer, the 
gross rental income from such building or structure shall include the rental value of the 
portion so occupied. 
(B) NONRESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY.—The term **nonresidential real property" mcanb 
section 1250 property which is not— 
(i) residential rental property, or 
(ii) property with a class life of lebS than 27.5 years. 
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(3) CLASSIFICATION OF CERTAIN PROPERTY.— 
(A) 3-YEAR PROPERTY.—The term "3-year property'' include*— 
(i) any race hon>c which h more than 2 yean* old at the time it ib placed in service, 
(ii) any horse other than a race horse which is more than 12 years old at the time it is 
placed in service, and 
(Hi) any qualified rent-to-own property. 
(B) 5-YEAR PROPERTY.—The term "5-year property" includes— 
(i) any automobile or light general purpose truck, 
(ii) any semi-conductor manufacturing equipment, 
(ii'i) any computer-based telephone central office switching equipment, 
(iv) any qualified technological equipment, 
(v) any section 1245 property used in connection with research and experimentation, 
and 
(vi) any property which— 
(I) is described in subparagraph (A) of section 48(aX3) (or would be so described if 
"solar and wind'' were substituted for "solar" in clause (i) thereof, 
(II) is described in paragraph (15) of section 48(1) (as in effect on the day before 
the date of the enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990) and is a 
qualifying small power production facility within the meaning of section 3(17XC) of 
the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 796(17X0), as in effect on September 1, 1986, or 
(III) is described in section 48(l)(3)(A)(ix) (as in effect on the day before the date 
of the enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990). 
Nothing in any provision of law shall be construed to treat property as not being described in 
clause (viXI) (or the corresponding provisions of prior law) by reason of being public utility 
property (within the meaning of section 48(aX3)). 
(C) 7-YEAR PROPERTY.—The term "7-year property" includes— 
(i) any railroad track, 
(ii) any property which— 
(I) does not have a classjife, and 
(II) is not otherwise classified under paragraph (2) or this paragraph. 
(D) 10-YEAR PROPERTY.—The term " 10-year property" includes— 
(i) any single purpose agricultural or horticultural structure (within the meaning of 
subsection 0X13)), and 
<ii) any tree or vine bearing fruit or nuts. 
(E) 15-YEAR PROPERTY.—The term "15-year property" includes— 
(i) any municipal wastewater treatment plant, 
(ii) any telephone distribution plant and comparable equipment used for 2-way 
exchange of voice and data communications, and 
(iii) any section 1250 property which is a retail motor fuels outlet (whether or not food 
or other convenience items are sold at the outlet). 
(F) IStricken.l 
(4) RAILROAD GRADING OR TUNNEL BORE.—The term "railroad grading or tunnel bore" means all 
improvements resulting from excavations (including tunneling), construction of embankments, 
clearings, diversions of roads, and streams, sodding of slopes, and from similar work necessary to 
provide, construct, reconstruct, alter, protect, improve, replace, or restore a roadbed or right-of-way 
for railroacftrack'. 
(5) WATER UTILITY PROPERTY.—The term "water utility property" means property— 
.(A^which'is an integral part'of the gathering, treatment, or commercial distribution of 
water, and which, without regard to this paragraph, would be 20-year prpperty, and 
[B) any municipal sewer. 
Amendments at the end of clause (ii) and inserting *\ and", and by adding 
P.L. 105-34, § 1086(bXl): a t *** e f K*a n e w c^a u s e ( U | ) t 0 rea<* a s ab°v e-
Act Sec. 1086(bXl) amended Code Sec. 168(eX3XA) by The above amendment applies to property placed in 
staking "and" at the end of clause (i), by striking the period service after August 5.1997. 
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P L 104-188. § 1120(a) 
Act Sex 1120(a) amended Code Sec 168(eX3XE) by 
striking and at tlie end of clause (i). by striking the period 
at the end of clause (u) and inserting .and .and by adding 
at the end a new clause (in) to read as above 
For the effective date of the above amendment, see 
Act Sec 1120(c). below 
P L 104-188. § 1120(c) 
Act Sec 1120(c) provides 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE—The amendments made by this 
section shall apply to property which is placed in service on 
or after the date of the enactment of this Act and to which 
section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 applies 
after the amendment made by section 201 of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 A taxpayer may elect (in such form and manner 
as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe) to have such 
amendments apply with respect to any property placed in 
service before such date and to which such section so applies 
P L 104-188. § 1613(bX3XA) 
Act Sec 1613(bX3XA) amended Code Sec 168(e) by 
adding at the end a new paragraph (5) to read as above 
P L 104-188. § 1613(bX3XBX>) 
Act Sec 1613(bX3XBX0 amended Code Sec 168(eX3) by 
stnkmg subparagraph (F) Prior to being stricken. Code Sec 
168(eX3XF) read as follows 
(F) 20-YEAR PROPERTY—The term 20-year property 
includes any municipal sewers 
The above amendments apply to property placed in 
service after June 12.1996, other than property placed in 
service pursuant to a binding contract in effect before 
June 10, 1996, and at all times thereafter before the 
property is placed in service 
P L 104-188. § 1702(hXlXA) 
Act Sec 1702(h)(1)(A) amended Code Sec 
168(eX3XBXvi) by striking or at the end of subclause (I), 
by striking the period at the end of subclause (II) and 
inserting . or", and by adding at the end thereof a new 
subclause (III) to read as above 
P L 104-188, § 1702(hXlXB) 
Act Sec 1702(hXlXB) amended Code Sec 168(eX3XB)by 
adding at the end a new flush sentence to read as above 
The above amendments are effective as if included in 
the provisions of the Revenue Reconahation Act of 1990 
(P L. 101-508) to which such amendments relate, 
P L 101508,§11812(bX2XA> 
Act Sec 11812(bX2XA) amended Code Sec 168(eX2XA) 
to read as above Prior to amendment. Code Sec 168(eX2XA) 
read as follows 
(A) RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTY—The term residen 
tial rental property has the meaning given such term by 
section 167(jX2XB) 
The above amendment generally applies to property 
placed in service after November 5, 1990 However, for 
exceptions see Act Sec 11812(cX2X3) below 
Act Sec 11812(cX2K3) provides 
(2) EXCEPTION —The amendments made by this section 
shall not apply to any property to which section 168 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 does not apply by reason of 
subsection (fX5) thereof 
( 3 ) EXCEPTION FOR PREVIOUSLY GRANDFATHER EXPENDI 
TURES,—The. amendments made by this section shall not 
apply to rehabilitation expenditures described in section 
252(fX5) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (as added by section 
1002(1X31) of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act 
of 1988) , n , 
P L 101.508. § 11813(bX9XAXiKu) (as amended by 
P L 104-188. § 1704(tXS4)) 
Act Sec 11813(bX9XAX0-0i) amended Code Sec 
l£8(eX3XB)(vi) by striking "paragraph (3XAXviu), 
(3XAXix), or (4) of section 48(1) in subclause (I) and 
inserting subparagraph (A) of seetion 48(aX3) (<»r would be 
so described if solar and wind were substituted for solar in 
clause (i) thereof) . and by inserting (as in effeet on the day 
before the date of the enactment of the Revenue Rceonciha 
tion Aet of 1990) after 48(1) in subelause (II) 
P L 101508.§11813(bX9XBX0 
Aet Sec 11813(b)(9)(B)(i) amended Code See 
168(eX3XDX0 by striking section 48(p) and inserting 
subsection (iX 13) 
The above amendments generally apply to property 
placed in service after December 31. 1990 However, for 
exceptions see Act Sec 11813(cX2) below 
Act Sec 11813(cX2) provides 
(2) EXCEPTIONS—The amendments made by this seetion 
shall not apply to— 
(A) any transition property (as defined in section 49(e) of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (as in effeet on the day 
before the date of the enactment of this Aet) 
(B) any property with respect to which qualified progress 
expenditures were previously taken into account under see 
tion 46(d) of such Code (as so in effect) and 
(C) any property described in section 46(bX2XO of sueh 
Code (as so in effect) 
P L 100-647. § 1002(aX21) 
Act Sec 1002(aX21) amended Code Sec 168(eX3XBXv) 
by striking out "any property and inserting in lieu thereof 
any section 1245 property 
P L 100-647. § 10020X2XC) 
Act Sec 10020X2XO amended Code Sec 168(e) by add 
mg at the end thereof a new paragraph (4) to read as above 
The above amendments are effective as if included in 
the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P L 
99-514) to which they relate 
P L 100-647. § 6027(a) 
Act Sec 6027(a) amended Code Sec 168(eX3) by redesig 
natmg subparagraphs (D) and (E) as subparagraphs (E) and 
(F). respectively, and by inserting after subparagraph (C) a 
new subparagraph (D) to read as above 
P L 100-647. §6027(bXD 
Act Sec 6027(bXD amended Code Sec 168(eX3XC) by 
adding and at the end of clause (t), by striking out clause 
(u) and by redesignating clause (in) as clause (u) Prior to 
amendment. Code Sec 168(eX3XCX") read as follows 
(a) any single-purpose agricultural or horticultural struc-
ture (within the meaning of section 48(p)), and 
'The above amendments shall generally apply to prop-
erty placed in service after December 31,1988 However, 
see Act Sec 6027(cX2), below, for an exception 
Act Sec. 6027(cX2) provides 
(cX2) EXCEPTION —The amendments made by this section 
shall not apply to any property if such property is placed in 
service before January 1, 1990, and if such property— 
(A) is constructed, reconstructed, or acquired by the 
taxpayer pursuant to a written contract which was binding 
on July 14, 1988, or 
(B) is constructed or reconstructed by the taxpayer and 
such construction or reconstruction began by July 14, 1988 
,P.L 100^547,5 6029(a)* 
Act Sec' 6029(a) amended Code S^ec 168(eX3XD), as 
amended by section 6027, to read as above Prior to amend 
ment. Code Sec 168(eX3XD) read as follows 
(D) 10-YEAR PROPERTY—The term 10 year property 
includes any smgle purpose agricultural or horticultural 
structure (within the*meaning of section 48(p)) 
The above amendment shall apply to property placed 
in service after December 31.1988 
|Sec. 168(0] 
(0 PROPERTY TO WHICH SECTION DOES NOT APPLY.—fhu» section shall not apply to— 
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(1) CERTAIN METHODS OF DEPRECIATION.—Any property if— 
(A) the taxpayer elects to exclude such property from the application of thib section, and 
(B) for the 1st taxable year for which a depreciation deduction would be allowable with 
respect to buch property in the hands of the taxpayer, the property is properly depreciated 
under the unit-of-production method or any method of depreciation not expressed in a term of 
yearb (other than the retirement-replacement-bettcrment method or similar method). 
(2) CERTAIN PUBLIC UTILITY PROPERTY.—Any public utility property (within the meaning of 
subsection (iX10)) if the taxpayer docs not use a normalization method of accounting. 
(3) FILMS AND VIDEO TAPE.—Any motion picture film or video tape. 
(4) SOUND RECORDINGS.—Any works which result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, 
or other soundb, regardless of the nature of the material (such as discs, tapes, or other 
phonorecordmgb) in which such sounds are embodied. 
(5) CERTAIN PROPERTY PLACED IN SERVICE IN CHURNING TRANSACTIONS.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Property— 
(i) debcribed in paragraph (4) of section 168(e) (ab in effect before the amendmentb 
made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986), or 
(ii) which would be described in such paragraph if such paragraph were applied by 
substituting " 1987" for " 1981" and " 1986" for " 1980" each place such terms appear. 
(B) SUBPARAGRAPH (AX") NOT TO APPLY.—Clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall not apply 
to— 
(i) any rebidential rental property or nonresidential real property, 
(ii) any property if, for the 1st taxable year in which such property ib placed in 
service— 
(I) the amount allowable as a deduction under thib section (as in effect before the 
date of the enactment of this paragraph) v.ith respect to such property is greater than, 
(II) the amount allowable as a deduction under this section (as in effect on or after 
such date and using the half-year convention) for such taxable year, or 
(Hi) any property to which this section (as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986) 
applied in the hands of the transferor. 
(C) SPECIAL RULE.—In the case of any property to which this section would apply but for 
this paragraph, the depreciation deduction under bection 167 shall be determined under the 
provibions of this section as in effect before the amendments made by section 201 of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. 
Amendments P.L. 100-647. § 1002(aX6XB): 
P.L. 101-508, § 11812(bX2XC)-
Act Sec 11812(bX2XC) amended Code Sec 168(0(2) by * c t ^ *™2<f*6XB), amendf* C o d e ^J?**™ b y 
striking "section 167(IX3XA)" and inserting "subsection a ^ i n * a t t h e e n d t h e r e o f n e w subparagraph (C) to read as 
oxior. above 
The above amendment generally applies to property inn-fiA7 s im?^vifiVRV 
placed in service after November 5, 1990.>However, for F L iW-04/. s lWAaxiOXB): 
exceptions see Act Sec. 11812(c)CZK3) in the amendment ^ ^
 1002(aXl6XB) amended Code Sec. 168(0(4) to 
notes following Code Sec. 168(e).
 r e a d a s a b o v e p n o r iQ a m e n d m e n t < Q ^ g ^ 168(0(4) read 
P.L. 100-647, § 1002(aX6XAXiMn): ^ follows 
Act Sec l002(a)(6)(A)(0-(rO amended Code Sec. 
168(fX5XB) by sinking out " 1st full taxable year" in clause (4) SOUND RECORDINGS.—Any sound recording described in 
(u) and inserting in lieu thereof "1st taxable year", and by section 48(rX5) 
sinking out "or" at the end of clause (l), by striking out the 
period at the end of clause (u) and inserting in lieu thereof ". The above amendments are effective as if included in 
or", and by adding at the end thereof new clause (m) to read the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 
as above 99-514) to which they relate. 
{Sec. 168(g)] 
(g) ALTERNATIVE DEPRECIATION SYSTEM FOR CERTAIN PROPERTY.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—In the case of— 
(A) any tangible property which cluring the taxable year ts'used predominantly outside the 
United State*. 
(B) any tax-exempt use property, 
(C) any tax-exempt bond financed property, 
(D) any imported property covered by an Executive order under paragraph (6), and 
Internal Revenue Code Sec. 168(g) 
4742 1986 Code—Subtitle A, Ch. IB, Part VI 9-97 
(E) any property to which an election under paragraph (7) applies, 
the depreciation deduction provided by section 167(a) shall be determined under the alternative 
depreciation system. 
(2) ALTERNATIVE DEPRECIATION SYSTEM.—For purposes of paragraph (1), the alternative 
depreciation system is depreciation determined by using— 
(A) the straight line method (without regard to salvage value), 
(B) the applicable convention determined under subsection (d), and 
(C) a recovery period determined under the following table: 
The recovery period 
In (he case of: shall be: 
(i) Property not described in clause (ii) or (iii) The class life. 
(ii) Personal property with no class life 12 years. 
(iii) Nonresidential real and residential rental property 40 years. 
(iv) Any railroad grading or tunnel bore or water utility property - 50 ycarb. 
(3) SPECIAL RULES FOR DETERMINING CLASS LIFE.— 
(A) TAX-EXEMPT USE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LEASE.—In the case of any tax-exempt use 
property subject to a lease, the recovery period used for purposes
 0f paragraph (2) shall in no 
event be less than 125 percent of the lease term. 
(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CERTAIN PROPERTY ASSIGNED TO CLASSES.—For purposes of paragraph 
(2), in the case of property described in any of the following subparagraphs of subsection (eX3), 
the class life shall be determined as follows: 
If property is described The class 










(C) QUALIFIED TECHNOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT.—In the case of any qualified technological 
equipment, the recovery period used for purposes of paragraph (2) shall be 5 years. 
(D) AUTOMOBILES, ETC.—In the case of any automobile or light general purpose truck, the 
recovery period used for purposes of paragraph (2) shall be 5 yearx 
(E) CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY.—In the case of any section 1245 property which is real 
property with no class life, the recovery period used for purposes of paragraph (2) shall be 40 
years. 
(4) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN PROPERTY USED OUTSIDE UNITED STATES.—Subparagraph (A) of 
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to— 
(A) any aircraft which is registered by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency 
and which is operated to and from the United States or is operated iinder contract with the 
United States; 
(B) rolling stock which is used within and without the United States and which is— 
(i) of a rail carrier subject to part A of subtitle IV of title 49, or 
(ii) of a United States person (other than a corporation described in clause (i)) but only 
if the rolling stock is not leased to one or more foreign persons for periods aggregating more 
than 12 months in any'24-month period; 
(C) any vessel documented under the laws of the United Stages which is operated in the 
foreign or domestic commerce of the United States; 
(D) any motor vehicle of a United States person (as defined in section 7701(aX30)) which is 
operated to and from the United States; 
(E) any container of a United States person which is used in the transportation of property 
to and from the United States; 
(F) any property (other than a vessel or an aircraft of a United States person which is used 
for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting resources from the outer 
Continental Shelf (within the meaning of section 2 of the' Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, as 
amended and supplemented; (43 U.S.C. 1331)); 
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(G) any property which is owned by a domestic corporation (other than a corporation which 
has an election in effect under section 936) or by a United States citizen (other than a citi/.en 
entitled to the benefits of section 931 or 933) and which is used predominantly in a possession of 
the United Stales by such a corporation or such a citizen, or by a corporation created or 
organized in, or under the law of, a possession of the United States; 
(H) any communications satellite (as defined in section 103(3) of the Communications 
Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. 702(3)), or any interest therein, of a United States person; 
(I) any cable, or any interest therein, of a domestic corporation engaged in furnishing 
telephone service to which section 168(i)(10XQ applies (or of a wholly owned domestic 
subsidiary of such a corporation), if such cable is part of a submarine cable system which 
constitutes part of a communication link exclusively between the United States and one Or more 
foreign countries; 
(J) any property (other than a vessel or an aircraft) of a United States person which is used 
in international or territorial waters within the northern portion of the Western Hemisphere for 
the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or transporting resources from ocean waters 
or deposits under such waters; 
(K) any property described in section 48(lX3)(AXix) (as in effect on the day before the date 
of the enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990) which is owned by a United States 
person and which is used in international or territorial waters to generate energy for use in the 
United States; and 
(L) any satellite (not described in subparagraph <VH)) or other spacecraft (or any interest 
therein) held by a United States person if such satellite or other spacecraft was launched from 
within the United States. 
For purposes of subparagraph (J), the term "northern portion of the Western Hemisphere" means 
the area lying west of the 30th meridian west of Greenwich, east of the international dateline, and 
north of the Equator, but not including any foreign countr> which is a country of South America. 
(5) TAX-EXEMPT BOND FINANCED PROPERTY.—For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term "tax-exempt 
bond financed property" means any property to the extent such property is financed (directly or 
indirectly) by an obligation the interest on which is exempt from tax under section 103(a). 
(B) ALLOCATION OF BOND PROCEEDS.—For purposes of subparagraph (A), the proceeds of any 
obligation shall be treated as used to fmance property acquired in connection with the issuance 
of such obligation in the order in which such property is placed in service. 
(C) QUALIFIED RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROJECTS.—The term "tax-exempt bond financed 
property" shall not include any qualified residential rental project (within the meaning of 
section 142(aX7)). 
(6) IMPORTED PROPERTY.— 
(A) COUNTRIES MAINTAINING TRADE RESTRICTIONS OR ENGAGING IN DISCRIMINATORY ACTS.—If 
the President determines that a foreign country— 
(i) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including variable import fees, which 
substantially burden United States commerce in a manner inconsistent with provisions of 
trade agreements, or 
(ii) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of international 
cartels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce, 
the President may by Executive order provide for the application of paragraph (1XD) to any 
article or class of articles manufactured or produced in such foreign country for such period as 
may be provided by such Executive order. Any period specified in the preceding sentence shall 
not apply to any property ordered before (or the construction, reconstruction, or erection of 
which began before) the date of the Executive order unless the President determines an earlier 
date to be in the public interest and specifies such date in the Executive order. * 
(B) IMPORTED PROPERTY.—For purposes of this subsection, the term "imported property" 
means any property if— 
(i) such property was completed outside the United States, or' 
(ii) less than 50 percent of the basis of such property is attributable to value added 
within the United States. 
For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "United States" includes the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico and the possessions of the United States. 
( 7 ) EJECTION TO USE ALTERNATIVE DEPRECIATION SYSTEM.— 
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<A) IN GENERAL.—If the taxpayer makes an election under this paragraph with respect to 
any class of property for any taxable year, the alternative depreciation system under this 
subsection shall apply to all property in such class placed in service during such taxable year. 
Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, in the case of nonresidential real property or 
residential rental property, such election may be made separately with respect to each property. 
(B) ELECTION IRREVOCABLE.—An election under subparagraph (A), once made, bhall be 
irrevocable. 
A m e n d m e n t s (4) PROPERTY USED PREDOMINANTLY OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
P L 105-34 § 1086(bX2) STATES —For purposes of this subsection, rules similar to the 
W o /«o^i-x/-*v J J .L . Li . • j - /~ A rules under section 48(aX2) (including the exceptions con-
c AC1^ vSS^P""?1^ ^Tfl-, m trfned i" subparagraph (B) thereof) shall apply ,n dctcrmin-
Sec. I68(gX3XB) by inserting be-fore the first item a new
 m g ^ ^ \ ^ y J. ^ p r c d < ) m i i ; <)UlMck. l h c 
item to read as above United States In addition to the exceptions contained tn 
The above amendment applies to property placed in
 s u c h subparagraph (B), there shall be excepted any satellite 
service after August 5.1997.
 w o t h c r spacecraft (or any interest therein) M d by a United 
P.L. 104-188, § 1120(b). States person if such satellite or spacecraft was launched 
Act Sec 1120(b) amended Code Sec 168(gX3XB) by from within the United States 
inserting after the item relating to subparagraph (EXu) in
 T h e a b o v e a m c n d m c n t generally applies to property 
the table contained therein a new ,tem relating to subpara-
 p U c e d {n ^ . ^ a f t c r D c c c m b c r 3 1 # 1 9 9 0 n < m o v e r . for 
graph (EXm) to read as above exceptions see Act Sec. 11813(cX2) in the amendment 
For the effective date of the above amendment, see notes following Code Sec. 168(e) 
Act Sec. 1120(c), below. 
P.L. 104-188, § 1120(c). provides. P L l00^7' § l°02(iX2XF): 
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE—The amendments made by this Act Sec. 1002(iX2XF) amended the Code Sex 168(sX2XC) 
section shall apply to property which is placed in service on by adding at the end of the table contained therein a new 
or after the date of the enactment of this Act and to which item to read as above, 
section 168 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 applies 
after the amendment made by section 201 of the Tax Reform The above amendment is effective as if included in the 
Act of 1986 A taxpayer may elect (m such form and manner provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P L 99-514) to 
as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe) to have such which it relates, 
amendments apply with respect to any property placed in 100-647 S 6077fhY2V 
service before such date and to which such section so applies ' * l w - ° ^ ' » S wz/KPAtJ. 
P.L. 104-188, § 1613<bX3XBX"). A c t Sec. 6027(bX2) amended the table contained in Code 
Act Sec. 1613(bX3XBXii) amended Code Sec. 168<gX3) by Sec. I68(gX3XB) to read as above. Prior to amendment, the 
striking the item relating to subparagraph (F) in the table t a b I e contained in Code Sec. 168(gX3XB) read as follows 
Prior to amendment, the item relating to subparagraph (F) If property is described T/JC t/av, 
in the table read as follows*
 in subparagraph: life /s 
(F) 50 (BXii) 5 
P.L. 104-188, § 1613(bX4). ^Xni ) 9 ^ 
Act Sec. 1613(bX4) amended Code Sec. 168(gX2XCXiv) (£ft\) V.'.'.V ' V.'W'.WV.V "." 15 
by inserting "or water utility property" after "tunnel bore". (DXO ............'......... I'.'.'.'.'.' . 24 
The above amendments apply to property placed in (DX»i) 24 
service after June 12,1996, other than property placed in, (E) 50 
service pursuant to a binding contract in effect before 
June 10, 1996, and at all times thereafter before the The above amendment shall generally applv to prop-
property is placed in service. e r t y P I a c e d m »*vtce after December 31. 1988. For an 
P I IA^IRA Ri7rr>n,vivrv exception see Act Sec. 6027(cX2) in the amendment 
P.L. 104-188, § 1702(hXlXC):
 n o t e s f 0 u o w i n g 168(e). 
Act Sec. 1702(hX 1XQ amended Code Sec. 168(gX4XK) by 
striking "section 48(aX3XAXi")" and inserting "section P.L. 100-647. § 6029(c): 
48(lX3XAXix) (as in effect on the day before the date of the _ ^ ^ . 
enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990)".
 f ^ x ^ i ? 2 * 0 ^ " ^ t h e J ? 5 * ™Uaincd in Code Sex. 
_,. . . . , , l68(gX3XB). as amended by section 6027, to read a> above. 
The above amendment is effective as if included in the p ^
 t o a m e n d m e n t < t h e t a b l e c o n t a i n c d i n Code Sec 
£ ° , V U ^ f c^L t h e ^ v ^ n u c u R e c o n « h a t l o n , A c t o f 1 9 9 0 168(gX3XB) read as follows: 
(P.L. 101-508) to which such amendment relates. 
P.L. 104-88. §304(a): If property is described Theclax, 
^ . .IV-T-^,
 a *~-^ / in subparagraph' life /v 
Act Sec. 304(a) amended Code Sec. 168(gX4XBX*0 by (BXii) 5 
striking "domestic railroad corporation providing transpor- (BXHi) 9 5 
tation subject to subchapter I of chapter 105" and inserting (CXO 10 
in lieu thereof "rail carrier subject to part A of subtitle IV". ([>) ....[.....]]....].].............. 15 
The above amendment is effective on January 1,1996. (EXO 24 
P.L. 101-508. §11813(bX9XC): ^ X U ) *t 
Act Sec. 11813(bX9XQ amended Code Sec. 168(gX4) to 
read as above. Prior to amendment. Code Sec. 168(gX4) read The above amendment applies to property placed in 
as follows: service after December 31,1988. 
[Sec. 168(h)] 
(h) TAX-EXEMPT USE PROPERTY.— 
(1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of this sec t ions 
Sec. 168(h) ©1997, CCH INCORPORATED 
Appendix F 
Findings of Fact Based Upon Marshaling of Evidence 
APPENDIX NO, F 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
RASED UPON MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE 
ISSUE NO. II: 
1. The property at issue is personal property, most of which may be classified 
as furniture, appliances, and electronics. 
2. The Salt Lake County Assessor issued audits of Action's personal property 
which was "out" on "rent-to-own" contracts. The audits used Action's wholesale cost of 
each item applied against the Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules For Personal 
Property Valuation. R. at 960-961. The first audit, issued during or about May, 1994, 
assessed Action's "rent-to-own" personal property for property tax years 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. The second audit, issued early in 1995, assessed Action's 
"rent-to-own" personal property for property tax year 1995. 
3. The Salt Lake County Assessor did not physically view Action's "rent-to-
own" personal property or base its assessments upon an appraisal of the actual property. 
R. at 954-956, 963, 969, 973. The assessments were based upon a review of Action's 
business/inventory records and an application of the Utah State Tax Commission's 
Recommended Schedules For Personal Property Valuation. R. at 946-947, 954-955, 969-
971,973. 
4. The Property Tax Division's policy regarding "rent-to-own" property was to 
follow the Tax Commission's administrative rule. TR. at 151-152. 
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5. The Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules For Personal Property 
Valuation classify "rent-to-own" property in a class of property generally reserved for 
electronics equipment that is subject to rapid functional and economic obsolescence, or 
has severe wear and tear and is subject to 5-year depreciation. R. at 959-960, 963, 969, 
971-972. 
6. The purpose of the Tax Commission's recommended schedules and of IRS 
class life and is to come to fair market value. R. at 972-973. 
7- The Salt Lake County Hearing Officer assigned to hear and decide Action's 
1995 appeal to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization found that the schedule used 
by the Salt Lake County Assessor to value Action's "rent-to-own" property "may be 
correct for property under typical daily usage, however, the appellant's property is not 
subject to typical wear and tear. The appellant has provided sufficient evidence to 
suggest the property should be classified into a different schedule . . . I will recommend 
the property be placed in Class I short-life property, a 3-year life schedule." R. at 984-
985. 
8- The useful life of "rent-to-own" property is affected by the nature of the 
customer. They are generally "more abusive and maybe careless with the way they 
handle their property. Many of them have pets. Many of them smoke without a care for 
taking care of the product. Many of them are transient in nature and move - and they 
move themselves, they don't always use . . .good moving procedures, pickup trucks and 
things like that. There's definitely a higher abusive rate on all of our product." R. at 901-
902, 984. 
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9. The typical "rent-to-own" customer has a below average income and has 
financial problems as a result of a bankruptcy, divorce, unemployment or other similar 
problems. R. at 901, 984. Half are home owners and half are renters. R. at 901. 
10. Action also had a problem with "skips" and "pawns" as customers would 
acquire product and pawn it, hide it and not pay, or leave the state with the product. R. at 
902. 
11. Action engaged Jerry Erkelens, a certified personal property appraiser as an 
expert witness to value property similar to the property assessed by the Salt Lake County 
Assessor. R. at 806-810, 812-813, 816, 907-908. The personal property valued by the 
certified appraiser was property that had been returned to Action following the expiration 
of a "rent-to-own" contract or a repossession. The date of the appraisal was "as off 
September 9, 1997, and included property that would have been subject to assessment by 
the Salt Lake County Assessor from 1994-1997. The certified appraiser valued the 
personal property using a "market approach" to value based upon actual sales he had seen 
of similar personal property in his business. R. at 807-810, 812-813, 823, 826-827. His 
appraisal was based upon the property's actual fair market value and not upon its 
liquidation value. His appraisal also considered the condition of, the demand for, and the 
obsolescence present in the personal property. R. at 813-814. The standard of fair market 
value used by the certified appraiser was "the price at which the property would exchange 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller. Neither being under compulsion to 
buy or compulsion to sell, both having reasonable knowledge." R. at 814. 
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12. The certified appraiser valued all of the used personal property that had 
been "out" on "rent-to-own" contracts, as opposed to a random sampling of such property. 
R. at 817-818. He described the personal property sold by rent-to-own businesses as "low 
end furniture" which would be the "least expensive furniture that's on the market today" 
and indicated that the quality of the furniture has an "impact on the value" and that "[i]t 
simply doesn't last as long. It wears out faster. It [is] used up much sooner than quality 
furniture." R. at 824-825. He observed the condition of most of the personal property to 
be "poor," "pretty beat up," "worthless," "destroyed", that "most of these items could be 
used for part[s] or a boat anchor", that [t]here's hardly anyone that would put any of this 
stuff in their house", and that it "was in real bad shape". R. at 816, 819-820, 827 (147-
148?), 984. He estimated the useful life of the personal property valued to have been "18 
months to two years." R. at 819, 863. This observation and estimate was particularly true 
for the electronics items. R. at 820. 
13, The certified appraiser implicitly questioned whether sales to subsequent 
buyers of personal property returned to a rent-to-own" business were arms-length sales 
because the price at which a "rent-to-own" business may resell an item of personal 
property to a subsequent buyer may exceed the personal property's fair market value 
because such buyers are a "special group of buyer", which is not "a typical buyer", as they 
"are desperate to but the items", and "[a]typical buyer . . . would [not] pay as much as 
someone who can't go to R.C. Wiley and make monthly payments." R. at 825-826. The 
ultimate sale price of "rent-to-own" property may exceed the property's actual fair market 
value. R. at 879-882, 913-915. 
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14. Action engaged Kent L. Thomas, a C.P.A. who had previously operated a 
competing "rent-to-own" business and who had previously served as president of the 
"rent-to-own" industry's trade association, as an expert witness. R. 829-832, 834, 
15. Mr. Thomas testified that "rent-to-own" property, particularly the items 
which are returned to a "rent-to-own" dealer, is subject to "great wear and tear" as a 
result of "rent-to-own* customers having a more transient lifestyle. R. at 859-861, 882-
883, 984. 
16. Mr. Thomas testified that the "merchandise used in the Rent-to-Own 
industry for sale to its customers has a useful life of approximately 18 to 24 months." R. 
at 855, 858-861, 863-867, 909, 928-929, TR. at 146-48. 
17. Dan Jones, the former president of Action, was involved with Action for 
fourteen years. 
18. The useful life testified to by Actions witnesses is the commercial useful 
life to the "rent-to-own" business and not the actual useful life to the buyer. R. at 871-
872, 882, 911-912, 966, 969. When a "rent-to-own" business finally transfers title to a 
customer following full payment, the property is no longer taxable. R. at 872, TR. at 148. 
19. The Salt Lake County Assessor presented no evidence to controvert the 
testimony of Mr. Erkelens, Mr. Thomas or Mr. Jones concerning their opinion of fair 
market value of Actions "rent-to-own" property. R. at 954-956, 963-964, 969, 973, 974. 
20. Surveys from 1994 and 1995 of "rent-to-own" businesses throughout the 
United States were introduced as exhibits. (Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3.) R. at 838-
839, 849. The surveys surveyed the type of depreciation used by "rent-to-own" 
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companies for tax and financial accounting purposes. R. at 845-846. During the audit 
periods, the depreciation method required by the Internal Revenue Service for the type of 
personal property sold by "rent-to-own" businesses is the Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System ("MACRS") which uses a five-year class life for such personal 
property. R. at 844-845. The survey identified five other depreciation methods used by 
the "rent-to-own" businesses surveyed for either tax or financial accounting purposes. R. 
at 840. The purpose of financial accounting is to "match", under generally accepted 
principles of accounting, the cost recovery of assets through depreciation to the actual 
income generated so that there will be an accurate matching of income and expenses on 
the financial statements. R. at 847. Tax accounting (depreciation) methods do not 
necessarily match income to expenses but are used by Congress to accomplish other 
purposes such as social purposes and revenue raising needs. Tax accounting does not 
necessarily have any thing to do with economic value or the economic realities of running 
a business. R. at 847. 
21. Although MACRS is the required method of tax depreciation for "rent-to-
own" businesses, the 1994 and 1995 surveys reflect that for "rent-to-own" companies 
with 5-10 stores, only 8% actually used MACRS for tax accounting purposes and 92% of 
these companies used other methods. R. at 847-848. The 1995 survey also reflects that 
for the "5-10" store class of survey respondents, 20% used an 18-month, straight-line 
method, 8% used a 21-month, straight-line method, 12% used a 24-month, straight-line 
method, 32% used an income forecasting method, and 8% used some other method of tax 
depreciation. For financial accounting purposes, the 1994 and 1995 surveys reflect that 
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for the "5-10" store class of "rent-to-own" businesses, 0% used MACRS for financial 
accounting, 36% used an 18-month, straight-line method, 12% used a 21-month, straight-
line method, 12% used a 24-month, straight-line method, 36% used an income forecasting 
method, and 4% used some other method of financial accounting depreciation. Pet. Ex. 2 
and 3. 
22. Action actually used a 24-month, straight-line tax and financial accounting 
method for depreciation of its "rent-to-own" property and Mr. Thomas's "rent-to-own" 
business used an 18-month, straight-line method for tax and financial accounting 
purposes. R. at 855. 
23. The national "rent-to-own" trade association, the Association of Progressive 
Rental Organizations ("APRO"), was concerned that MACRS did not reflect the actual 
value of "rent-to-own" personal property and engaged in litigation with Internal Revenue 
Service and in lobbying Congress to change the depreciation method applicable to "rent-
to-own" property so that such property more closely matches the economic life of the 
property. R. at 848-849, 893. 
24. There is a distinction between depreciation for tax purposes and 
depreciation for valuation purposes. R. at 972. 
25. The Tax Commission's Recommended Schedules For Personal Property 
Valuation basically follow IRS guidelines for the depreciation of property. R. at 891, TR. 
at 154-155. The Tax Commission puts great weight in IRS class life system and if the 
IRS changed the class life for a particular type of property, the Tax Commission would 
give that change considerable weight in making any changes to its valuation schedules. 
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R. at 891, 929-930, TR. at 154-155. The Tax Commission would not rely upon IRS 
changes to MACRS or ACRS because they have no real reference to the valuation 
procedure. R. at 916. 
26. Internal Revenue Code Section 168 (e) was amended as part of the 
"Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997" and provided that "qualified rent-to-own property" would 
be classified as "3-year property" and have a "class life" of 4 years. R. at 848-849, 893, 
983 (A copy of relevant pages from a publication reporting the changes to Sections 168 
(e) and (g) was submitted to the Tax Commission at formal hearing. For some unknown 
reason, only one of those pages is included in Volume 4 of 4 of the Tax Commission's 
Record. A copy of the actual submission, as it was submitted to the Tax Commission on 
September 11, 1997, is appended hereto as Appendix D and a more formal copy of 
relevant statutes from the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is appended hereto as Appendix 
E.) 
27. Denny Liddle of the Utah State Tax Commission testified that depreciation 
for tax purposes is accelerated depreciation to the level allowed by the IRS. TR. at 153-
154. He also testified that class life is what the Tax Commission considers to be the 
economic life or useful productive life of the property. TR. at 153-154. 
28. Sterling Patrick of the Salt Lake County Assessor's Office testified that 
there is a difference between useful life and economic life. R. at 949-950, 969. 
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